Brookshire Brothers v. Aldridge: Making the Spoliation Instruction a Litigation Unicorn by Johnson, Shawn A.
Texas A&M Law Review 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
2015 
Brookshire Brothers v. Aldridge: Making the Spoliation Instruction 
a Litigation Unicorn 
Shawn A. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shawn A. Johnson, Brookshire Brothers v. Aldridge: Making the Spoliation Instruction a Litigation Unicorn, 
3 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 445 (2015). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V3.I2.8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Texas A&M Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, 
please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
NOTE
BROOKSHIRE BROTHERS V. ALDRIDGE:
MAKING THE SPOLIATION INSTRUCTION
A LITIGATION UNICORN
By: Shawn A. Johnson*
ABSTRACT
In July 2014, the Texas Supreme Court issued a new framework for analyz-
ing and remedying the destruction of evidence, holding that spoliation jury
instructions are warranted only when a trial court finds that a party acted with
the specific intent to conceal discoverable evidence or that a party’s negligent
destruction wholly prevented another from presenting a claim or defense. The
Court addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion in submitting a
spoliation instruction in a slip-and-fall case in which the defendant premises
owner retained only eight minutes of video of the plaintiff’s fall and allowed
the remaining footage to erase automatically. Although the Court recognized
that a party’s willful blindness is sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement,
according to critics, the Court’s application of the rule raises questions about
the actions constituting willful blindness in the spoliation context and will
likely invite parties to freely destroy relevant evidence without fearing a spolia-
tion instruction or other harsh sanction. Although a thorough analysis of
Texas spoliation law shows that the Brookshire framework largely follows the
Trevino test previously used by a majority of Texas courts, the Court’s appli-
cation of the framework indicates that spoliation instructions will now be
nearly impossible for litigants to obtain.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Documents create a paper reality we call proof. The absence of
such documentary proof may stymie the search for the truth.”1 Over a
decade ago, U.S. District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin recognized
that missing evidence severely impacts parties in litigation and that
the matter is made more complex by the rise of electronic informa-
tion, which can be intentionally or inadvertently destroyed easily.2
Since that time, courts and legal scholars have sought to resolve the
lack of clear guidance on how courts should handle missing electronic
evidence in litigation.3 In Brookshire Brothers v. Aldridge, a classic
slip-and-fall spoliation case, the Texas Supreme Court answered many
questions left unresolved by prior cases regarding the framework with
1. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (footnote and internal quotations omitted).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Justice Rebecca Simmons & Michael J. Ritter, Texas’s Spoliation
“Presumption,” 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 691, 693 (2012).
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which courts are to analyze and remedy the destruction of evidence.4
Specifically, the Court seems to have adopted most of Justice James
A. Baker’s framework laid out in his Trevino v. Ortega concurrence,5
but the updated framework will likely make it almost impossible for
litigants to obtain spoliation jury instructions or other meaningful
remedies.
Legal commentators quickly joined the Brookshire dissent’s criti-
cisms of the framework, arguing that the majority’s application of the
framework blends the culpability and prejudice elements and raises
serious questions about the actions that constitute intentional destruc-
tion of evidence.6 These critics also argue that the Court’s new frame-
work significantly limits the broad discretion traditionally granted to
judges to remedy spoliation,7 which will likely entice parties to freely
destroy relevant evidence without fearing one of the most serious spo-
liation sanctions—a spoliation jury instruction.8 Part II of this Note
provides a brief overview of the rise of electronically stored informa-
tion (“ESI”) and electronic discovery (“e-discovery”). Part III gives a
background of historical Texas spoliation law and describes how a ma-
jority of Texas courts analyzed spoliation issues before Brookshire.
Part IV presents the new Brookshire spoliation framework and the
Texas Supreme Court’s application of the framework to the facts of
the case. Part V considers the Brookshire dissenting opinion and other
commentators’ criticisms of the new framework, discussing the merits
of each. Part VI surveys subsequent cases interpreting and applying
the Brookshire spoliation framework, highlighting the substantial
challenges faced by those seeking to obtain a spoliation jury instruc-
tion. Finally, Part VII suggests technological, procedural, and judicial
mechanisms that may alleviate the challenges posed by the destruction
of evidence in the age of digital information.
4. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2014); see also Simmons &
Ritter, supra note 3; Neal A. Hoffman, The New Spoliation: How the Texas Supreme
Court Clarified and Redefined the Law, 78 TEX. B.J. 270, 270 (Apr. 2015) (asserting
that Brookshire “was the first time that the court would significantly address the sub-
stantive requirements of seeking and obtaining a spoliation instruction in almost a
decade”).
5. Compare Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 19–27, with Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d
950, 955–61 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., Kent Sullivan, Advice on Evidence Preservation Stops Short, TEX.
LAW. IN-HOUSE TEX., Sept. 8, 2014, at 6, 7, http://www.texaslawyer.com/the-newspa-
per [http://perma.cc/NZ2D-WH33]; Judge Xavier Rodriguez, Brookshire Bros.:
Cleanup on Aisle 9. The Current Messy State of Spoliation Law, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J.
447, 448 (2015).
7. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Natalie M. Orr, The Adverse Inference Instruction
After Revised Rule 37(e): An Evidence-Based Proposal, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299,
1301 (2014) (discussing spoliation frameworks akin to that laid out in Brookshire).
8. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 34, 37–38 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
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II. THE RISE OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
AND E-DISCOVERY
Pretrial discovery is central to the litigation process.9 The primary
pretrial discovery devices are interrogatories, depositions, requests for
admissions, and requests for production.10 Although pretrial discovery
promotes the economical use of judicial resources by reducing the
number of controverted issues for trial, identifying groundless claims,
and increasing the possibility of pretrial settlement, it also imposes
significant risks in litigation, such as delay, increased costs, and the
possibility of harassment through pretrial “fishing expeditions.”11 In
fact, litigants can use discovery devices abusively by imposing “large
and unjustifiable costs” on the opposing party, leading to burdensome
and expensive discovery disputes.12 Therefore, courts must balance
the benefits of pretrial discovery with the risks inherent in its abuse.
Amplifying these concerns, utilization of and reliance on ESI is cer-
tainly at an all-time high, but is yet to reach its zenith. For example, in
the corporate context, over 90% of all business records are created in
digital form and are never converted to paper.13 Likewise, according
to a report by The Sedona Conference in 2007, the average worker
sends and receives 100 emails per day,14 and as early as 2003, daily
email traffic equaled annual deliveries by the U.S. Postal Service.15 In
fact, some experts estimate that by 2020, there will be nearly 26 billion
devices on the Internet.16 Similarly, a national survey in 2012 reported
that approximately 72% of reporting retailers utilize digital video re-
cording systems, with 21% planning to increase use of these systems
the next year.17 Even law enforcement is beginning to use technology
in new ways, such as the use of police dashboard and body cameras.18
9. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary
on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA
CONF. J. 189, 192 (2007) [hereinafter Sedona 2007]; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation.”).
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 235 (4th pocket ed. 1996).
11. Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 942 (1961).
12. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989).
13. Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerabil-
ity of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 8 & n.4 (2006).
14. Sedona 2007, supra note 9, at 198.
15. Kathy Perkins & Dave Deppe, “Byte” Me! Protecting Your Backside in an
Electronic Discovery World (Not Just for Litigators), 76 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 22, 23
(2007).
16. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES (May 2, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Reports/CV05-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/77GM-9CWD] [hereinafter MAY 2
REPORT].
17. RICHARD C. HOLLINGER & AMANDA ADAMS, NATIONAL RETAIL SECURITY
SURVEY, FINAL REPORT, 21–22 (2012) (on file with author).
18. Justin Sink, Obama to Provide Funding for 50,000 Police Body Cameras, THE
HILL (Dec. 1, 2014), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/225583-obama-to-
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As the use of technology continues to increase in all facets of daily
life, there is a greater demand for clear and workable legal guidelines
pertaining to the retention and use of digital information in criminal
and civil litigation. However, legal rules develop slowly compared to
the rapid development and widespread adoption of information tech-
nology,19 and new technologies can quickly make legal rules obsolete
or unworkable.
Discovery disputes are not new, but the growing reliance on ESI
poses unique challenges.20 For example, discoverable information
could be found throughout multiple storage devices, such as main-
frames, offsite backup tapes, desktop and laptop computers, remova-
ble storage devices, emails, and handheld devices.21 Likewise, multiple
copies or versions of the requested information could be stored across
the various devices.22 To combat these challenges, many organizations
have retention policies that call for the purging of email and associ-
ated electronic documents according to a schedule.23 Of course, busi-
nesses are justified in desiring to rid their computer systems of
unnecessary data in order to improve system efficiencies.24 However,
another reason to define a limited duration retention policy is “[t]o
reduce the dangers of eDiscovery. Minimizing the amount of elec-
tronic material an organization keeps means it has less material to
produce during eDiscovery—and consequently it is less likely to hand
over incriminating evidence.”25 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that “[d]ocument retention policies . . . are created in part
to keep certain information from getting into the hands of others . . .
[and] are common in business.”26 Adding greater complexity, embed-
ded documentary details—metadata—may contain particularly rele-
vant information but also creates burdens for corporations entirely
provide-funding-for-50000-police-body-cameras [http://perma.cc/2D8A-SJBG]; Mar-
tina Kitzmueller, Are You Recording This?: Enforcement of Police Videotaping, 47
CONN. L. REV. 167, 177–79 (2014).
19. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, “May I Have My Electronic Discovery in
Paper Please?” Lawyers Inch Their Way Toward a Paperless Practice, VT. B. J., Sum-
mer 2004, at 47.
20. Sedona 2007, supra note 9, at 192.
21. Id. at 196.
22. Id.
23. Perkins & Deppe, supra note 15, at 24.
24. See Crist, supra note 13, at 9. In fact, Judge Scheindlin recognized in Zubulake
IV that, were a corporation required to “preserve every shred of [evidence] . . . . [it]
would cripple large corporations.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
25. DAVID FERRIS, SETTING RETENTION POLICY FOR ELECTRONIC INFORMATION




26. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (internal quo-
tations omitted) (“It is . . . not wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to
comply with a valid document retention policy under ordinary circumstances.”).
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distinct from the paper form.27 Similarly, documentary proof may
have been deleted from its primary source but remain on backup
tapes long after its destruction.28 Thus, courts must balance the inter-
ests of adjudicating disputes on the evidence with the burdens faced
by litigants bearing high financial and resource costs to preserve every
shred of potentially relevant ESI.
III. SPOLIATION OVERVIEW
Suppression and destruction of evidence is commonly cited as “a
regular or frequent problem” in litigation.29 But missing evidence can
be irreplaceable. This suppression or destruction of evidence, also
known as spoliation, “can thereby undermine the truth-seeking func-
tion of the judicial system and the adjudicatory process.”30 In re-
sponse, many states, including Texas, and federal courts have
recognized that the destruction of evidence raises a presumption, or
“adverse inference” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
the missing evidence was unfavorable to the party that caused its
destruction.31
In the personal tablet, smartphone, and social-networking age, the
ability to preserve evidence has become much easier, but these same
technologies enhance the risk of both intentional and accidental spoli-
ation in the context of electronic discovery.32 Even more, businesses
are departing from paper records and moving to electronic document
storage.33 Due to increased tension between these forces and the re-
lease of a landmark judicial attempt to ease that tension, sanctions
relating to e-discovery violations started to increase rapidly in 2004
and have continued to do so ever since.34
27. See Crist, supra note 13, at 21–22, 26–29.
28. Id. at 24–25.
29. Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 699 (quoting Charles R. Nesson, Incentives
to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991)).
30. Id. at 701.
31. See, e.g., H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bruner, 530 S.W.2d 340, 343–44 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Waco 1975, writ dism’d).
32. Spoliation can even occur when a civil defendant deletes content off social
media sites at the direction of her employer. Scott McConchie, Social Media and Spo-
liation—Can A Client Delete Her Facebook Posts?, NAT’L L.R. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/social-media-and-spoliation-can-client-delete-her-
facebook-posts [http://perma.cc/NAJ5-EVEG]; see also Crist, supra note 13, at 9 n.5.
33. Crist, supra note 13, at 8; see also The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Princi-
ples: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Docu-
ment Production, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 151, 151 (2004) [hereinafter Sedona 2004].
34. Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et. al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 794 (2010). Sanctions for e-discovery abuses are not lim-
ited to certain categories of claims. Id. at 798 (ranking the occurrence of e-discovery
sanctions: employment (17%); contract (16%); intellectual property (15.5%); tort
(11%); civil rights (8.5%); bankruptcy (3%)).
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That landmark spoliation case is Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.35
Zubulake was an equities trader who sued her employer for gender
discrimination, failure to promote, and retaliation.36 She argued that
the evidence necessary to prove her case existed in email correspon-
dence sent between various employees that were stored only on
UBS’s computer systems because UBS had deleted all other data
stores.37 After U.S. District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ordered
the parties to share the cost of restoring certain backup tapes that
contained emails relevant to Zubulake’s claims, the parties discovered
that particular tapes were missing.38 Zubulake then sought sanctions
against UBS for its failure to preserve the missing tapes and deleted
emails.39 Specifically, she requested an order requiring UBS to pay
the full costs of restoring the remaining tapes, an adverse inference
instruction against UBS with respect to the missing tapes, and an or-
der directing UBS to bear the costs of re-deposing individuals con-
cerning issues raised in newly produced emails.40
After finding that UBS had a duty to preserve the backups and
emails because litigation was reasonably anticipated and information
contained therein was relevant to the anticipated claim,41 Judge
Scheindlin found that UBS had failed to satisfy its duty despite its
three-year data retention policy and attorney-imposed litigation
hold.42 Judge Scheindlin explained that an “adverse inference instruc-
tion is an extreme sanction and should not be given lightly” and that a
35. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Zubulake V, a 2004 decision,
has been cited as the case that “propel[led] the e-discovery industry into . . . one
worth billions.” Victor Li, Zubulake 10 Years After, ABA J., September 2014, at 48,
49, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/looking_back_on_zubulake_10_
years_later [http://perma.cc/CKY3-68UK]. However, Zubulake was not the first case
to severely punish litigants for misconduct during the discovery phase. See, e.g., Fuqua
v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 199 F.R.D. 200, 206 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (granting
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions relating to suppression of evidence and, in order to
punish and deter future misconduct, entering a judgment against the defendants for
actual and punitive damages, barring the plaintiffs from presenting witnesses or evi-
dence during the subsequent trial on damages, and awarding the plaintiffs attorneys’
fees and expenses).




40. Id. at 215–16. An adverse inference instruction is a jury charge instructing the
jury that it may (or must) “infer that the party who destroyed potentially relevant
evidence did so out of a realization that the evidence was unfavorable” to its case. Id.
at 219–20 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
41. Id. at 217–18. Litigants are not required to retain every document in their
possession, but they must preserve what they know, or reasonably should know, is
relevant in the action, reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, or the subject of a pend-
ing discovery request. Id. at 217.
42. Id. at 218–19. A defendant must suspend its routine document retention/
destruction policy and impose a “litigation hold” once it reasonably anticipates litiga-
tion to ensure relevant documents are preserved. Id. at 218.
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party requesting the instruction must show that: (1) the spoliating
party had an obligation to preserve the evidence at the time it was
destroyed; (2) the records were destroyed with a culpable state of
mind; and (3) the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim
or defense such that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that it
would support the party’s claim or defense.43 Judge Scheindlin noted
that when a party destroys evidence intentionally or willfully, “that
fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate relevance,” but when the de-
struction is merely negligent, the party seeking sanctions must estab-
lish the relevance of the destroyed evidence.44
Considering the facts on hand, Judge Scheindlin found that UBS
may have been grossly negligent, but did not willfully destroy the
backup tapes.45 Zubulake therefore had to show that the information
contained on the (destroyed) tapes was relevant to her case. However,
Judge Scheindlin found that Zubulake failed to meet her burden and
held that, in the case of negligent spoliation, “it cannot be inferred
from the conduct of the spoliator that the evidence would even have
been harmful to him.”46 Even though Judge Scheindlin did not grant
Zubulake’s requested adverse inference instruction, she did grant her
request that UBS bear the costs of re-deposing certain witnesses to
inquire into issues raised by the destruction of evidence and any newly
discovered emails.47
Following the re-depositions, Zubulake learned of more deleted
emails and of emails existing on UBS’s active servers that it never
produced despite Zubulake’s discovery request almost two years ear-
lier, and again moved for an adverse inference instruction.48 The new
evidence showed that UBS personnel deleted relevant emails from
their computers after the litigation hold that were lost forever, even
though they had received at least two directives from counsel not to,49
and that UBS failed to timely deliver multiple emails that were un-
questionably relevant to Zubulake’s claim.50 Zubulake finally had evi-
dence to show “that UBS acted wilfully in destroying potentially
relevant information, which resulted either in the absence of such in-
formation or its tardy production,” so that the lost information was
presumed relevant.51 Judge Scheindlin granted Zubulake’s requested
adverse inference instruction with regard to the deleted emails, recog-
nizing that it was necessary to (1) punish UBS and deter future mis-
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 221.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 222.
48. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 426–27, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
49. Id. at 429, 434–35.
50. Id. at 430.
51. Id. at 436.
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conduct and (2) “restore Zubulake to the position that she would have
been in had UBS faithfully discharged its discovery obligations.”52
Judge Scheindlin ruled that the following instruction would be given
to the jury:
You have heard that UBS failed to produce some of the e-mails
sent or received by UBS personnel in August and September 2001.
Plaintiff has argued that this evidence was in defendants’ control
and would have proven facts material to the matter in controversy.
If you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, and that
the evidence was within its control, and that the evidence would
have been material in deciding facts in dispute in this case, you are
permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to UBS.
In deciding whether to draw this inference, you should consider
whether the evidence not produced would merely have duplicated
other evidence already before you. You may also consider whether
you are satisfied that UBS’s failure to produce this information was
reasonable. Again, any inference you decide to draw should be
based on all of the facts and circumstances in this case.53
Zubulake won a $29.2 million jury verdict and settled with UBS
before appeal,54 and Judge Scheindlin’s groundbreaking spoliation
framework created an industry, setting the tone for spoliation law ever
since.55
Since Zubulake, spoliation instructions have been on the rise. For
example, while a spoliation instruction was the selected sanction in
23% of federal and state cases in 2004, by 2011, it had become the
most common sanction granted—being imposed 57% of the time
when courts issued ESI discovery sanctions.56 However, practitioners
and their clients have not been welcoming of what they call exces-
sively burdensome and overreaching obligations.57
But spoliation issues existed long before 2004. For example, in H. E.
Butt Grocery Co. v. Bruner, a 1975 Texas premises liability case shar-
ing many similarities with Brookshire, a plaintiff sued after slipping on
an onion stalk near the checkout counter in the defendant’s grocery
store.58 After seeing the onion that caused the plaintiff’s fall, an em-
52. Id. at 437 (“No one can ever know precisely what was on those tapes, but the
content of e-mails recovered from other sources—along with the fact that UBS em-
ployees wilfully deleted e-mails—is sufficiently favorable to Zubulake that I am con-
vinced that the contents of the lost tapes would have been similarly, if not more,
favorable.”).
53. Id. at 439–40.
54. Li, supra note 35, at 51.
55. Id. at 52.
56. The Honorable David C. Norton et. al., Fifty Shades of Sanctions: What Hath
the Goldsmith’s Apprentice Wrought?, 64 S.C. L. REV. 459, 468 (2013).
57. Li, supra note 35, at 53.
58. H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bruner, 530 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco
1975, writ dism’d). Bruner “is considered a seminal case in Texas spoliation law.”
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ployee that had come to her aid said to another, “Get rid of that
thing.”59 On appeal, the court found significant that “the Defendant’s
employees deliberately ‘got rid’ of the onion stalk . . . . [It] was last
known to have been in possession of Defendant’s employees, was not
produced in court, nor did Defendant offer any explanation for the
intentional and deliberate spoliation of this vital piece of evidence.”60
The court upheld the lower court’s finding of negligence, holding:
The intentional spoliation and destruction of the onion stalk cre-
ated the presumption that its introduction into evidence would have
been unfavorable to Defendant, that is to say, that it would have
shown that it was sufficiently “stepped on and mashed” as to lead to
the conclusion that it had lain on the floor for a sufficient period of
time that the Defendant should have, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, discovered and removed it.61
A. Texas’s Historical Approach to Spoliation
This Section dives further into the elements that a majority of Texas
courts have traditionally required to prove spoliation and the reme-
dies available to cure that misconduct. It also provides a brief over-
view of the upcoming changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(e), the federal spoliation rule for electronically stored information.
Texas courts have historically treated spoliation law as a common
law evidentiary concept rather than an independent tort, and in Tre-
vino v. Ortega, the Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize a tort
for spoliation because the missing evidence does not cause an injury
independent of the underlying action in which it arises.62 Instead,
Texas courts have sought to rectify spoliation within the lawsuit where
the improper conduct occurred and have left the proper remedial ac-
tion to the trial judge’s broad discretion, based on the particular facts
of each case.63 For more than a decade, a majority of Texas courts
followed the spoliation framework announced by Justice Baker in his
Trevino concurring opinion.64 Under Justice Baker’s framework, a
Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 709.
59. Bruner, 530 S.W.2d at 342.
60. Id. at 343.
61. Id. at 344.
62. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 952–53 (Tex. 1998).
63. Id. at 953.
64. See Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 18–19 (Tex. 2014); see also
Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 458. However, courts have not defined spoliation and the
degree of culpability or prejudice required to trigger judicial remedies consistently.
Compare Ham v. Equity Residential Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Corp., 315 S.W.3d 627, 631
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (defining spoliation as “the deliberate destruc-
tion of, failure to produce, or failure to explain the non-production of relevant evi-
dence, which, if proved, may give rise to a presumption that the missing evidence
would be unfavorable to the spoliator.”), with Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, 251
S.W.3d 88, 101 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008) (“Spoliation is the improper de-
struction of evidence . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 298 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 2009).
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party alleging spoliation must prove three components: duty, breach,
and prejudice.65 This Section will discuss each. Note the striking simi-
larities between Justice Baker’s 1998 Trevino concurrence and Judge
Scheindlin’s 2004 Zubulake decision.66
1. Duty
Under Justice Baker’s spoliation framework, a party alleging spolia-
tion must first establish that the spoliating party had a duty to pre-
serve the evidence.67 This duty may arise through statute, regulation, a
lawyer’s ethical duty, or through the common law.68 At common law,
the duty to preserve evidence arises “when a party reasonably antici-
pates or foresees litigation,” with the primary inquiry being “whether
a reasonable person in the party’s position would have anticipated liti-
gation and whether the party actually did anticipate litigation.”69 This
is akin to the standard used by courts when determining whether a
party may assert an investigative privilege.70 But Justice Baker ex-
plained that, unlike in the investigative privilege context, actual, sub-
jective notice of possible litigation is not necessary: “[A] party may
reasonably anticipate suit being filed . . . before the plaintiff manifests
an intent to sue. . . . [T]here may be times when certain independent
facts will put a party on notice of the potential for litigation.”71 Once
litigation becomes reasonably foreseeable, that party must take steps
to ensure that relevant evidence is preserved.72 Thus, in order to estab-
lish the second prong of the duty analysis, the party alleging spoliation
must establish that the spoliating party had a duty to preserve that
specific evidence.73 However, a party reasonably anticipating litigation
need not keep everything; he or she must only preserve evidence he or
she “knows, or reasonably should know is relevant in the action, is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,
is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, [or] is the sub-
ject of a pending discovery sanction.”74 The Texas Supreme Court
adopted Justice Baker’s duty component in 2003.75
65. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954–55 (Baker, J., concurring).
66. Compare Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 955–58, with Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212,
217–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
67. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 955.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 956.
70. Id. (citing Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1993)).
71. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 955, 957; see also Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
73. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 957 (Baker, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 957 (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F.
Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984)). Implicit in this element is that the movant must
show that the evidence existed. See Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 729.
75. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2003).
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2. Breach
Next, Justice Baker’s framework requires the party alleging spolia-
tion to show that the other party breached its duty to preserve the
relevant missing or altered evidence by failing to exercise reasonable
care.76 Justice Baker specifically noted that “[w]hile allowing a court
to hold a party accountable for negligent as well as intentional spolia-
tion may appear inconsistent with the punitive purpose of remedying
spoliation, it is clearly consistent with the evidentiary rationale sup-
porting it because the remedies ameliorate the prejudicial effects re-
sulting from the unavailability of evidence.”77 Importantly, Justice
Baker said that a data retention policy that conflicts with the preserva-
tion duty “will not excuse the obligation to preserve evidence.”78
However, the degree of culpability (intentional, reckless, negligent,
etc.) is also relevant to determining the appropriate remedy.
3. Prejudice
Finally, Justice Baker’s framework requires that the party alleging
spoliation show that the missing evidence “hinders its ability to pre-
sent its case or defense.”79 Justice Baker provided a number of factors
for trial judges to consider when determining whether a party’s case
has been prejudiced. “Most importantly, courts should consider the
destroyed evidence’s relevancy. . . . giv[ing] deference to the non-
spoliating party’s assertions about relevancy.”80 This deference stems
from the spoliation presumption—first recognized by the Texas Su-
preme Court in 1852—that all things are presumed against the spolia-
tor.81 Moreover, if the spoliator breached his duty to preserve the
evidence intentionally or in bad faith, a court may find “relevancy
based solely on this fact,” assuming that there is no evidence to the
contrary.82 However, if the breaching party was merely negligent, the
movant must present some evidence regarding what the missing evi-
dence would have shown that suggests it “would have been helpful to
the nonspoliating party’s case or defense.”83 A party that has been
deprived of particularly relevant evidence will naturally be able to
show higher prejudice. Another factor Justice Baker provided was
“whether the destroyed evidence was cumulative of other competent
evidence that a party can use in place of the destroyed evidence, and
76. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 957 (Baker, J., concurring). The party alleging spolia-
tion should also move to compel production of the evidence before trial to avoid
waiving the issue. Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 729.
77. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 957.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 957–58.
80. Id. at 958.
81. Cheatham v. Riddle, 8 Tex. 162, 167 (1852); see also H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v.
Bruner, 530 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1975, writ dism’d).
82. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 958 (Baker, J., concurring).
83. Id.
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whether the destroyed evidence supports key issues in the case.”84 In
other words, as the availability of other evidence increases, the preju-
dicial effects of any missing relevant evidence decreases.85 However,
the spoliating party may show that the missing or altered evidence is
irrelevant, cumulative of other available evidence, or that it did not
intentionally breach its preservation duty.86
4. Spoliation Remedies
The final step in Justice Baker’s framework, if the nonspoliating
party can reach this point, is the judicial determination as to what
sanctions to impose on the spoliator.87 In Texas, the primary objective
underlying spoliation law is remedial—to restore the injured party to
the same position he or she would have been in had the evidence been
available.88 Of course, a missing piece of evidence could be irreplacea-
ble, and often only the spoliator knows the precise contents and value
of the missing evidence, so courts must speculate to some extent as to
what sanction will compensate the injured party for the lost evi-
dence.89 This is also important because it recognizes that, irrespective
of the spoliator’s culpability (even if mere negligence), sanctions are
required to “ameliorate the prejudicial effects resulting from the un-
availability of evidence.”90 But spoliation remedies also serve punitive
and deterrence functions.91 For example, the risk of a severe spolia-
tion sanction deters parties from destroying key evidence before
trial.92 Moreover, the spoliation instruction’s allowable inference that
the missing evidence was harmful to the person that destroyed it pun-
ishes the spoliator by “placing the risk of an erroneous judgment on
the party that wrongfully created that risk.”93
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure grant trial judges broad author-
ity to issue discovery sanctions, including an award of attorney’s fees
or costs to the harmed party, exclusion of evidence, striking a party’s




87. Id. at 959.
88. Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 706; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106
S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2003) (“A trial judge should have discretion to fashion an ap-
propriate remedy to restore the parties to a rough approximation of their positions if
all evidence were available.”); see also Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954 (Baker, J.,
concurring).
89. See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953 (“[T]here is no one remedy that is appropriate
for every incidence of spoliation; the trial court must respond appropriately based
upon the particular facts of each individual case.”).
90. Id. at 957.
91. Id. at 954.
92. Norton, supra note 56, at 468.
93. Id.
94. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b).
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enumerate many sanctions, the list is not inclusive.95 Rule 215’s reme-
dies, in addition to other discretionary case-specific remedies, are
available for spoliation.96 Even in the pre-litigation context where the
Rules do not apply, a court may remedy the spoliation through its
inherent power to “aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the admin-
istration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and
integrity.”97 However, trial judges must “weigh . . . the spoliator’s cul-
pability and the prejudice the nonspoliator suffers.”98 This is similar to
the balancing test used by federal courts, considering the degree of
fault, the degree of prejudice, and fairness.99 Ultimately, the sanction
must be “properly tailored to remedy the prejudice.”100
Potential sanctions range from dismissal or default judgment against
the spoliator, exclusion of evidence or testimony, or imposition of a
spoliation jury instruction.101 The power to issue spoliation instruc-
tions is granted to courts irrespective of Rule 215’s remedies, through
Rule 277’s grant of broad discretion for courts to instruct juries.102
Importantly, Justice Baker recognized that this is a legal question,
solely in the province of the trial judge: “Deciding whether to submit
this instruction is a legal determination. As stated earlier, the trial court
should first find that there was a duty to preserve evidence, the
spoliating party breached that duty, and the destruction prejudiced
the nonspoliating party.”103
In Trevino, Justice Baker described two types of available spoliation
instructions.104 Under the rebuttable presumption, the court instructs
the jury that the spoliating party negligently or intentionally destroyed
evidence and that it should presume that the destroyed evidence was
unfavorable to the spoliator on the particular fact or issue that the
destroyed evidence might have supported, with the spoliating party
bearing the burden to disprove the presumed fact.105 Here, the non-
spoliating party can use the presumption itself to prove an element of
his or her case.106 Justice Baker recommended this presumption as
prima facie evidence when the nonspoliating party could not survive a
95. Id.
96. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953–54 (Baker, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 958 (quoting Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex.
1979)).
98. Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
99. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994).
100. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 959 (Baker, J., concurring).
101. See id. at 959–60 (noting that default judgment or dismissal is the most severe
sanction and should only be imposed under the most egregious circumstances: when
the spoliator intended to subvert the discovery process, or when the nonspoliating
party suffers great prejudice and no other sanction could cure the prejudice).
102. TEX. R. CIV. P. 277; Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 960.
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directed verdict, summary judgment, or factual or legal sufficiency
challenge on appeal without the missing evidence.107 In the adverse
presumption, the court instructs the jury that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to the spoliating party, but the presumption itself is
insufficient to prove the nonspoliating party’s case—it is just another
factor for the jury’s consideration when weighing the evidence.108
Spoliation instructions serve as essential remedies that help pre-
serve the judicial system’s truth-seeking function and enable parties to
present their case even after evidence has been destroyed. However,
as recognized in Brookshire, a spoliation instruction can also nega-
tively affect the trial’s fairness by shifting the jury’s focus from the
merits to improper conduct during discovery, skewing its verdict
based on pretrial conduct rather than the facts of the case.109 Even
more, by encouraging the jury to find against the spoliator,110 a spolia-
tion instruction “often ends litigation—it is too difficult a hurdle for
the spoliator to overcome.”111 These effects certainly serve to punish
the spoliator and deter future spoliators, but they exceed the central
compensatory purposes behind spoliation.112 In fact, Judge Scheindlin
has recently argued that the adverse inference instruction is not a
well-suited sanction for punitive purposes because it “can affect the
relative strength of the parties’ positions in a lawsuit.”113 Instead,
Judge Scheindlin argues that a monetary sanction, such as bearing dis-
covery costs or awarding attorney fees, “punishes the wrongdoer with-
out distorting the evidentiary balance.”114 Moreover, a sanction that
leads to the determination of the case, such as striking pleadings, de-
fault judgments, or even a spoliation instruction, may raise Due Pro-
cess concerns.115 Notably, spoliating parties, or their attorneys, may be
subject to criminal prosecutions or disciplinary or contempt proceed-
ings in addition to in-trial sanctions.116 However, these collateral pro-
ceedings do not operate to compensate the victim’s injuries,117 and
thus do not comport with the primary purpose of discovery sanc-
tions—fashioning “an appropriate remedy to restore the parties to a
107. Id.
108. Id. at 960–61.
109. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 13–14 (Tex. 2014).
110. Id. at 17.
111. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
112. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 17; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d
718, 724 (Tex. 2003).
113. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1301.
114. Id.
115. TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917–18 (Tex. 1991)
(noting that there are constitutional limitations on the courts’ power to adjudicate a
party’s claims without regard to the merits).
116. Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 703.
117. Id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (West Supp. 2014); TEX. DISCIPLI-
NARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2,
subtit. G, app. A (West 2005); TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 802(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
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rough approximation of their positions if all evidence were
available.”118
B. Federal Changes
Most federal courts require proof of bad faith for the submission of
a spoliation instruction—what they call an “adverse inference instruc-
tion.”119 In this context, “bad faith” means that there is “some indica-
tion of an intent to destroy the evidence for the purpose of obstructing
or suppressing the truth.”120 However, the federal circuits face the
same opposing approaches as did Texas courts pre-Brookshire.121
Some circuits use the adverse inference instruction for negligent spoli-
ation,122 and others require less than bad faith but more than ordinary
negligence.123
Just as the Texas Supreme Court sought to resolve the appellate
split in Brookshire, federal rule makers are in the process of amending
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 37(e) to resolve the circuit
split. Likewise, a proposed change to Rule 26(b)(1) would require
“proportional discovery,” and restrict discovery to information rele-
vant to the asserted claims and defenses.124 In 2014, the U.S. Judicial
Conference approved the proposed Rule 37(e) and Rule 26(b)(1)
changes.125 The Supreme Court approved the changes on April 29,
118. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2003); see also
Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 707.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 2000); FED. R. CIV.
P. 37(e) (prohibiting courts from imposing discovery sanction when evidence lost “as
a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system”).
But see Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002)
(authorizing adverse inference instructions on a finding of negligence or gross
negligence).
120. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004).
121. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1300–01.
122. Id. (citing Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, Chairman, 709 F.3d 19, 27
(D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Grosdidier v. Isaacson, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014);
DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d at 108).
123. Id. (citing Stocker v. United States, 705 F.3d 225, 235 (6th Cir. 2013) (know-
ingly, even if without intent to breach a duty to preserve); Gomez v. Stop & Shop
Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395, 399 (1st Cir. 2012) (requiring “notice of a potential
claim and of the relevance to that claim of the destroyed evidence”); Vulcan Materials
Co. v. Massiah, 645 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2011) (willful conduct)).
124. Li, supra note 35, at 53.
125. THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, THE 2015 CIVIL RULES PACKAGE AS APPROVED BY THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (Mar. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/litigation/materials/2015-sac/written_materials/5_1_2015_sum-
mary_of_rule_package.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4WJ9-3U34] [hereinafter
2015 CIVIL RULES PACKAGE]; see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT
OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES: CIVIL RULES EXCERPT (APPENDIX B)
(Sept. 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-
2014-add.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3VA-VESE] [hereinafter SEPT. 2014 APPENDIX].
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2015.126 If left untouched by Congress, the amendments will take ef-
fect December 1, 2015.127
Under the approved changes, Rule 37(e) applies when there has
been: (1) an ESI preservation duty and trigger, arising when litigation
is reasonably foreseeable; followed by (2) a party’s failure to take rea-
sonable steps to preserve the information; and (3) the lost ESI cannot
be restored or replaced through additional discovery.128 After the mo-
vant meets this test, the trial judge must determine whether there has
been prejudice; if so, the judge may not order sanctions greater than
necessary to cure the prejudice.129 Specifically, a court may not order
the most serious remedies—a spoliation instruction, dismissal, or de-
fault judgment—absent a finding of “intent to deprive.”130 Since the
remedies are compensatory rather than punitive, rule makers have
sought to reserve the most serious remedies for cases where bad faith
or intent to deprive the adversary of the evidence is shown.131 Impor-
tantly, the Advisory Committee’s Notes state that the Rule “would
not prohibit a court from allowing the parties to present evidence to
the jury concerning the loss and likely relevance of information and
instructing the jury that it may consider that evidence . . . in making its
decision.”132 This Note will show that the changes to Rule 37(e) and
the Brookshire spoliation framework are quite similar but contain
some important distinctions.
IV. SPOLIATION UNDER BROOKSHIRE V. ALDRIDGE
A. Facts
On September 2, 2004, Jerry Aldridge entered a Brookshire Broth-
ers grocery store and then slipped and fell near a display table.133 He
did not initially alert store employees that he was injured, so store
employees did not complete an investigation or accident report.134
However, Aldridge went to the hospital about ninety minutes after his
fall.135 Five days later, Aldridge returned to the store to report the
incident, and Brookshire prepared an incident report based on his
126. Order Adopting Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 29,
2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T52A-2VSK].
127. Id.; see also 2015 CIVIL RULES PACKAGE, supra note 125, at 1.
128. James S. Kurz et. al, The Long-Awaited Proposed FRCP Rule 37(3), its Work-
ings, and its Guidance for ESI Preservation, ROCKET DOCKET NEWS, Sept. 2014, at 8,
11–12, http://www.fedbar.org/image-library/chapters/northern-virginia-chapter/fall-
2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/SDM6-QB3X].
129. Id. at 13.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 13–14.
132. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1301–02 (citing MAY 2 REPORT, supra note
16, at 322).
133. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. 2014).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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statements and the recollections of the assistant manager in charge at
the time of Aldridge’s fall.136 The report stated that “Aldridge slipped
on grease that had leaked out of a container by the ‘Grab N Go’”—a
cooked and packaged rotisserie chicken display in the store’s deli, lo-
cated about fifteen feet from the area of Aldridge’s fall.137
Brookshire maintained surveillance cameras near the checkout
counters that recorded in a continuous loop, overwriting footage
every thirty days.138 However, the camera’s placement prevented a
clear view of the fall because of its distance from the area where Al-
dridge fell and because of its placement in relation to a cloth-covered
display table, which was positioned such that it prevented a direct
view of the spill.139 Sometime after Aldridge had reported the inci-
dent, Robert Gilmer, Brookshire’s Vice President of Human Re-
sources and Risk Management, made the decision to retain only an
eight-minute copy, beginning when Aldridge walked into the store
and ending shortly after his fall.140 Accordingly, the remaining footage
of Aldridge’s September 2 fall was automatically overwritten in early
October.141 However, Aldridge had requested the footage of his fall
on September 13, which Gilmer denied on September 29.142
According to its routine practice, Brookshire initially offered to pay
some of Aldridge’s medical expenses143—only for his first medical bill,
a follow-up visit, and prescriptions related to those visits.144 However,
on September 29, the same day Gilmer rejected Aldridge’s request for
the full tape, Brookshire offered to pay for “a visit with a neurosur-
geon and several weeks of physical therapy.”145 Nevertheless, in June
2005, Gilmer wrote to Aldridge, stating, “that he had reviewed the
video and determined that Brookshire Brothers was going to deny re-
sponsibility.”146 In August 2005, following the commencement of the
underlying lawsuit, Aldridge’s counsel requested additional footage,
but Brookshire could not complete the request because the recording
system had recorded over those events.147 At trial, Aldridge argued





140. Id. Specifically, six minutes and fifty-three seconds of the preserved video
were from the period directly before Aldridge fell. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 12-
08-00368-CV, 2010 WL 2982902, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 30, 2010) (mem. op.)
(not designated for publication), rev’d, 438 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2014).
141. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 15.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 31 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id. at 15 (majority opinion).
147. Id.
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to spoliation of key evidence relating to Brookshire’s constructive
knowledge of the spill and requested a spoliation instruction.148
A key issue in slip-and-fall cases is whether the defendant had ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition—such as a
slippery substance on the floor.149 A plaintiff can satisfy his burden of
proof by showing that the defendant actually knew that the substance
was on the floor or that it is more likely than not that the condition
existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportu-
nity to discover it.150 Gilmer testified at trial that he instructed Brook-
shire employees to retain only five to six minutes before the fall to
capture from the time Aldridge entered the store to his fall and that
he believed the remaining video “[w]asn’t relevant.”151 However, Gil-
mer also testified that he understood that whether Brookshire em-
ployees should have known about the spill would be a critical issue in
a slip-and-fall case, but averred that he did not decide to save only
eight minutes “in anticipation of this trial.”152
The Brookshire employee that executed Gilmer’s order testified
that he only watched the video beginning with the approximate time
of Aldridge’s fall, and no other evidence showed that any other
Brookshire employee watched anything but the eight-minute copy.153
The eight-minute copy did not show a spill or leak occurring nor did it
show the spill area.154 However, it did show Brookshire employees
walking past the area minutes before Aldridge fell, Aldridge’s fall,
and an employee signaling for clean-up help thereafter.155 Addition-
ally, a store employee testified that a substance should not remain on
the floor longer than five minutes without an employee cleaning it
up.156
Rather than hearing this evidence and deciding on Aldridge’s spoli-
ation request outside of the jury’s presence, the trial judge allowed the
jury to hear the aforementioned evidence and, exercising his discre-
tion, gave the following spoliation jury instruction:
In this case, Brookshire Brothers permitted its video surveillance
system to record over certain portions of the store surveillance
video of the day of the occurrence in question. If you find that
Brookshire Brothers knew or reasonably should have known that
148. Id. at 16. It should be noted that in June 2005, when Aldridge’s lawyer re-
quested more surveillance footage of Aldridge’s fall than the eight-minute video pro-
vided, Brookshire refused “to assist [Aldridge] in helping [him] build [his] case,”
claiming that the video did not focus on the area of his fall. Id. at 32 (Guzman, J.,
dissenting).
149. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992).
150. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002).
151. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 16 (alteration in original).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 27–28.
154. Id. at 30.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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such portions of the store video not preserved contained relevant
evidence to the issues in this case, and its non-preservation has not
been satisfactorily explained, then you are instructed that you may
consider such evidence would have been unfavorable to Brookshire
Brothers.157
Notably, this instruction left it for the jury to determine whether spoli-
ation had occurred.158 The jury determined that Brookshire Brothers’
negligence proximately caused Aldridge’s fall and awarded Aldridge
just over $1 million in damages to compensate him for past and future
medical expenses and lost earnings.159
B. Texas’s New Spoliation Framework
On review by the Texas Supreme Court, the Brookshire Court laid
out a new framework governing spoliation and the circumstances in
which a trial judge may impose a spoliation instruction as a sanc-
tion.160 First, the Court held that spoliation is the intentional or negli-
gent breach of duty to preserve relevant evidence, where the
spoliating party had such duty.161 Second, the Court held that the trial
judge, not the jury, determines as a matter of law whether spoliation
has occurred, and then assesses a proportionate remedy.162 This
makes sense because spoliation is not an independent tort, but a dis-
covery abuse like other evidentiary misconduct.163 This approach also
mitigates the risk that spoliation evidence will unfairly detract the
jury’s attention from the merits to the spoliator’s misconduct during
the litigation process. Thus, instead of offering spoliation evidence to
the jury, the judge should conduct an initial hearing to determine
whether spoliation has occurred.164
1. Finding Spoliation: Duty, Scope, and Breach
The new spoliation framework includes a two-step process. First,
the court must determine whether spoliation has occurred, with the
initial burden on the party alleging spoliation.165 This includes two dif-
ferent inquiries—whether there was a preservation duty at the time
and the scope of that duty.166 A party is under a duty to preserve
evidence when he or she knows or reasonably should know that there
157. Id. at 16.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 14.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. 2009).
164. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 20.
165. Id. This aligns closely with Justice Baker’s framework, which required the trial
court to determine whether spoliation had occurred. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d
950, 954 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring).
166. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 20.
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is a substantial chance—more than an abstract possibility—of litiga-
tion and that evidence in his or her possession or control will be mate-
rial and relevant to that claim.167 Next, the court must determine that
the alleged spoliator breached its duty to preserve that material and
relevant evidence through a lack of reasonable care.168 In reality, this
is not new—it directly aligns with Justice Baker’s framework laid out
in Trevino.169
2. Determining the Remedy: Prejudice, Culpability,
and Proportionality
After finding that spoliation has occurred, the trial judge must de-
termine the appropriate remedy.170 The Court recognized the reme-
dies available under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2 but also
highlighted the trial court’s “discretion to craft other remedies it
deems appropriate in light of the particular facts of an individual
case.”171 Thus, the Court will require that any spoliation sanction be
proportionate to the act of spoliation, considering the spoliator’s cul-
pability and the prejudice inflicted on the nonspoliating party.172 The
Court explained that the proportionality requirement “logically fol-
lows from the remedial purpose . . . of a spoliation remedy under
Texas law, which is to restore the parties to a rough approximation of
their positions if all evidence were available.”173
In measuring prejudice, trial judges should consider the destroyed
or missing evidence’s relevancy to key issues, detriment to the spoliat-
ing party, assistance to the nonspoliating party, and whether the
spoliated evidence was cumulative of other competent evidence that
the nonspoliator can use instead of the missing evidence.174 However,
the “differences in kind and quality” between the available and miss-
ing evidence is “a key factor in analyzing prejudice.”175 For example,
eyewitness testimony may serve as competent evidence in lieu of miss-
ing video, but that testimony may be inherently flawed and less per-
suasive than the video. Therefore, trial judges should consider these
differences when measuring prejudice.
Moreover, the Court recognized the applicability of the spoliation
presumption in the context of intentional spoliation, explaining that
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 956–57 (Baker, J., concurring) (“While a litigant is
under no duty to keep or retain every document in its possession . . . it is under a duty
to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know is relevant . . . .”).




174. Id. at 21–22. The Court also noted that some harm is required before any
spoliation remedy can be granted. Id. at 21 n.9.
175. Id. at 22.
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intentional destruction of evidence may, “[a]bsent evidence to the
contrary,” suffice to support a finding of relevancy and prejudice.176
However, if the spoliation was merely negligent, the party moving for
a spoliation instruction must offer “some proof about what the de-
stroyed evidence would show.”177 Importantly, the Court explained
that intentional spoliation includes the concept of willful blindness,
“which encompasses the scenario in which a party does not directly
destroy evidence known to be relevant and discoverable, but nonethe-
less ‘allows for its destruction.’”178 The Court noted that “[t]he issue
of willful blindness is especially acute in the context of automatic elec-
tronic deletion systems. A party with control over one of these sys-
tems who intentionally allows relevant information to be erased can
hardly be said to have only negligently destroyed evidence.”179
a. The Spoliation Instruction as a Remedy
The Court did not discuss other remedies in detail, but it held that a
spoliation instruction may only be submitted to the jury where the
trial judge has determined that a party acted (1) with the specific in-
tent to conceal relevant evidence and other remedies are insufficient
to reduce the prejudice caused by the spoliating party’s actions or (2)
negligently, causing irreparable harm to the nonspoliating party’s abil-
ity to present a claim or defense in any meaningful way.180 The Court
rationalized this decision primarily on two grounds. First, applying the
spoliation presumption against a negligent spoliator makes little sense
because the presumption infers that the spoliation occurred because
the evidence was harmful to that party’s case.181 Second, the harsh
spoliation instruction, which can “be tantamount to a death-penalty
sanction,” serves remedial rather than punitive objectives, and sanc-
tions should bear a direct relationship to the offensive conduct
involved.182
C. Application
Skirting its new rule, the Court jumped to the remedy analysis and
found that there was no evidence that Brookshire allowed the footage
176. Id. (alteration in original).
177. Id. (quoting Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 958 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J.,
concurring)).
178. Id. at 24–25 (quoting Andrew Hebl, Spoliating of Electronically Stored Infor-
mation, Good Faith, and Rule 37(e), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 79, 97–98 (2008)).
179. Id. at 24–25 n.17.
180. Id. at 14.
181. Id. at 23.
182. Id. Sanctions that adjudicate a claim and preclude the presentation of the mer-
its of the case, such as striking pleadings or rendering default judgments, constitute
“death-penalty” sanctions. Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d
177, 184–85 (Tex. 2012).
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to overwrite with intent to conceal or destroy relevant evidence.183
The Court also found that any negligence by Brookshire in keeping
only eight minutes of footage did not cause irreparable harm so as to
permit a spoliation instruction under the narrow exception.184 Rather,
the Court explained that the negligence exception applies when the
spoliated evidence is the only evidence available for a party to de-
velop its claim or defense, and here, additional evidence was available
to prove Aldridge’s claim.185 The Court did not address whether
Brookshire had the requisite duty to preserve the video or that its
failure to keep a longer portion prejudiced Aldridge short of irrepara-
ble harm.186
The Court based its finding of no intent in part on the fact that,
prior to the footage automatically overwriting, Aldridge had only re-
quested footage of “the fall,” and did not request additional footage
until almost one year later, after the remaining footage had been de-
stroyed.187 Further, the Court explained that there was no evidence
that Brookshire’s employees viewed anything other than the eight
minutes; thus, there was no way that Brookshire based its decision to
preserve only the smaller portion on what the footage would have
shown.188 Apparently, because there was no proof that Brookshire
viewed anything but the eight-minute tape, the Court found it specula-
tive that Brookshire knew what the remaining video contained so as
to purposefully conceal relevant evidence.189
V. CRITICISMS OF THE COURT’S APPROACH
Although the Court propagated a seemingly reasonable spoliation
framework that answers many questions it had previously left un-
resolved,190 the Brookshire dissent and legal commentators have criti-
cized the framework and its application in Brookshire.191 These
criticisms boil down to four basic complaints. First, the dissent argued
183. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d 9 at 27; see also Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 462–64
(“[T]he court never addressed whether Brookshire Brothers actually possessed a duty
to preserve. . . . The court also did not address when the duty to preserve was trig-
gered. . . . [T]he court makes no conclusion as to whether the missing hours of video-
tape contained material and relevant evidence.”).
184. Id. at 28.
185. Id. (noting that the eight-minute video was preserved and shown to the jury, as
was the incident report, and that Aldridge testified).
186. Id. at 27.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 27–28 (noting that if Brookshire had let the full video overwrite, the
outcome might be different).
189. Id. at 28.
190. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722–23 (Tex. 2003)
(leaving open the questions of mental culpability, degree of prejudice required, and
burden of proof).
191. See, e.g., Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 30 (Guzman, J., dissenting); Sullivan, supra
note 6; Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1302–03, 1308–10, 1312–13; Rodriguez,
supra note 6.
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that the Brookshire framework significantly departs from decades of
Texas spoliation jurisprudence by failing to provide trial courts with
the necessary discretion to remedy spoliation in a time that limited
duration retention policies have become the norm.192 Second, the dis-
sent believed that the Court’s application of the framework renders
the concept of “willful blindness” meaningless.193 Third, legal com-
mentators have noted that the Court left open important questions,
such as the meaning of a “reasonable” data retention policy.194 Fi-
nally, both the dissent and legal commentators have argued that the
Court should have deferred to the rulemaking process.195 This Section
explores each criticism’s strength.
A. A Significant Departure from Decades of
Spoliation Jurisprudence
The Brookshire dissent argued that the majority’s framework signif-
icantly departs from decades of Texas spoliation jurisprudence.196 Spe-
cifically, Justice Guzman highlighted the Court’s departure from the
broad discretion traditionally granted to trial courts regarding the ad-
mission of spoliation evidence at trial and for crafting appropriate
remedies.197 The dissent emphasized that judges need this broad dis-
cretion to respond appropriately in the era of limited duration reten-
tion policies.198 However, a review of historical spoliation
jurisprudence shows that the Brookshire framework is not much more
than a reinvigorated variant of Justice Baker’s framework.
1. Finding Spoliation and the Admissibility of Spoliation Evidence
Regarding the first step of the spoliation inquiry, where the trial
court determines as a matter of law whether spoliation has occurred,
both Justice Baker and the Brookshire Court recognized that the
judge, rather than the jury, must determine whether spoliation has oc-
curred, and then impose an appropriate remedy.199 This naturally
flows from the fact that spoliation is not an independent tort but
rather a discovery abuse like other evidentiary misconduct,200 and it is
192. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 30–32; Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1302–03,
1308–10, 1312–13.
193. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 37; see also Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 469–70.
194. Sullivan, supra note 6.
195. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 38–39; Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1308 n.57.
196. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 30.
197. Id. at 34–35.
198. Id. at 31.
199. Compare Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., con-
curring) (“[T]he trial court should determine whether sanctions or a presumption are
justified. This is a question of law for the trial court.”), with Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at
20–21 (majority opinion).
200. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 952 (explaining that the “traditional response to the
problem of evidence spoliation properly frames the alleged wrong as an evidentiary
concept, not a separate cause of action”).
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well established that judges resolve evidentiary matters.201 By con-
trast, the dissent argued that trial judges historically could allow spoli-
ation discussions at trial, as allowed by the Texas Rules of
Evidence.202 The dissent pointed to a 2001 appellate decision, Lively
v. Blackwell, holding that the question of spoliation is not exclusively
reserved to the trial court as a question of law.203 However, the dis-
sent, like the Lively court, presupposed that evidence pertaining to
the act of spoliation is relevant under Rule 401 and skipped ahead to
Rules 402 and 403.204
It is clear that the circumstances relating to the spoliation of evi-
dence fail to satisfy the definition of “relevancy” under Rule 401 of
the Texas Rules of Evidence and that the question of spoliation is at
best a preliminary question under Rule 104(a). Rule 401 defines rele-
vant evidence as that having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.205 In
other words, as the first step towards admissibility, evidence must tend
to prove or disprove some issue relevant to the parties’ underlying
claims.206
Whether a party spoliated evidence necessarily differs from whether
the missing evidence is itself relevant because spoliation is not a tort
in Texas and does not become a fact issue for a party to prove in his or
her case. The issues relevant to Aldridge’s slip-and-fall claim related
to evidence tending to show that: (1) Brookshire had actual or con-
structive knowledge of the spill; (2) the spill posed an unreasonable
risk of harm; (3) Brookshire did not exercise reasonable care to re-
duce or eliminate the risk; and (4) Brookshire’s failure to use such
care proximately caused his injuries.207 Of course, Aldridge could
have proven knowledge with evidence indicating that the spill existed
long enough to give Brookshire “a reasonable opportunity to discover
it,”208 which the full tape would likely have done. However, evidence
regarding what happened to the tape does not bear on one of these
ultimate issues that Aldridge had to prove in order to prevail.
201. See, e.g., Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234
(Tex. 2007); Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001);
TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b) (“[T]he court in which the action is pending may, after notice
and hearing, make such orders in regard to the failure as are just . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
202. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 33–35 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
203. Lively v. Blackwell, 51 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
204. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 33–35 (Guzman, J., dissenting); Lively, 51 S.W.3d at
640–41.
205. TEX. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
206. Sims v. Dempsey-Tegler & Co., 487 S.W.2d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1972, no writ).
207. See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992).
208. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002).
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Instead, spoliation issues have historically been a question for the
judge under Texas law.209 Indeed, the Lively decision directly contra-
dicts Justice Baker’s framework that a majority of Texas courts would
later adopt,210 which specifically held that the question is one of
law.211 In fact, the Lively court based its decision on a Texas Supreme
Court opinion holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding the spoliation evidence, merely because the Court did not
take the opportunity to expressly hold that spoliation is purely a ques-
tion of law.212 But even that decision recognized the matter as a Rule
104(a) preliminary question.213 Moreover, the Lively court did not
hold that the spoliation evidence was admissible; it instead held that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the evi-
dence.214 Regardless, Justice Baker also recognized that the issue of
spoliation is a question of law for the judge to decide. In fact, when
explaining the duty prong of the spoliation initial inquiry, Justice
Baker adopted the “anticipation of litigation” definition used in the
context of investigative privileges,215 which are widely recognized as
Rule 104(a) preliminary questions for the judge alone.216 Thus, one
can hardly argue that Brookshire’s endorsement of Justice Baker’s
framework constitutes a “significant departure” from past
jurisprudence.
Like the Brookshire dissent, Judge Scheindlin and U.S. District
Court Judge Xavier Rodriguez217 have argued that juries are capable
of hearing spoliation evidence and deciding on the issue of intent and
that juries should play that role.218 While agreeing that judges typi-
209. See, e.g., Massie v. Hutcheson, 270 S.W. 544 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925)
(whether destruction or loss of deed was prompted by motives innocent of corrupt
intent or design was preliminary question for court); TEX. R. EVID. 104(a).
210. See, e.g., Clark v. Randalls Food, 317 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Buckeye Ret. Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394,
401 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds, 180 S.W.3d
183, 199 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).
211. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Miller v. Stout, 706 S.W.2d 785, 787–88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ)
(“Only ultimate issues of fact are to be submitted to a jury. . . . Such proceedings as
those involving determination of motions for sanctions because of failure to respond
to discovery requests . . . often involve resolution [by a judge] of questions of fact.”)).
212. Lively v. Blackwell, 51 S.W.3d 637, 640–41 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, pet. de-
nied) (“We note that in Malone v. Foster . . . a case decided the same day as Trevino,
the Texas Supreme Court declined to adopt this position when given the opportunity
to do so.”).
213. Malone v. Foster, 977 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. 1998).
214. Lively, 51 S.W.3d at 642.
215. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 956 (Baker, J., concurring).
216. See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); Kos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2000, pet. ref’d); McDuffie v. State, 854 S.W.2d 195, 212 (Tex. App.—Beau-
mont 1993, writ ref’d).
217. Judge Rodriguez is former Texas Supreme Court Justice and currently serves
as a District Judge in the Western District of Texas. Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 447.
218. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1309 (“We respectfully disagree with the
Texas Supreme Court that juries are institutionally incapable of drawing reasoned
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cally resolve evidentiary matters, Judge Scheindlin explains that “eval-
uating competing factual scenarios and determining a party’s intent
are exactly the type of functions that juries routinely perform.”219 But
this misses the point: The trial judge must determine, as a question of
law, whether spoliation occurred before determining what sanction is
appropriate.220 Judge Rodriguez appears to recognize this point:
Prior to Brookshire Bros., in a hypothetical slip-and-fall case, if
the trial court had made all the appropriate findings to support the
submission of a spoliation instruction, at trial both parties would
submit evidence regarding what the missing video would show.221
However, Judge Rodriguez argues that some evidence about the spoli-
ation is necessary “to give the jury context.”222 That’s true—evidence
“regarding the content of the spoliated evidence that is relevant to a
claim or defense [is] admissible.”223 But evidence that is not relevant
is inadmissible.224 Because spoliation is, at best, a Rule 104(a) prelimi-
nary question, evidence regarding the acts of spoliation must go
before the trial judge, acting as the gatekeeper, to apply the rules of
evidence.225 Additionally, the trial judge, not the jury, is in the best
position to evaluate the facts and equities of discovery disputes to de-
termine whether a discovery abuse has occurred, the spoliator’s culpa-
bility, and harm to the other party.226 Even more, judges who allow
parties to present spoliation evidence at trial before deciding the issue
unnecessarily risk presenting prejudicial evidence to the jury.227
Therefore, although juries may be capable, trial judges are in the best
position and are required by the rules of evidence to resolve whether
spoliation has occurred.
2. Detaching Prejudice from the Spoliation Inquiry
Although Justice Baker and the Brookshire Court chose the same
standard to determine whether a preservation duty exists and deter-
conclusions about how evidence was lost or destroyed.”); Rodriguez, supra note 6, at
475–76 (“This evidence would be absolutely critical in assisting the jury in under-
standing the nature of the spoliated evidence and the inference to be drawn from its
destruction.”).
219. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1309.
220. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954 (“[T]he trial court should determine whether sanc-
tions or a presumption are justified. This is a question of law for the trial court.”).
221. Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 477 (emphasis added).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 475.
224. TEX. R. EVID. 402.
225. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. 2009) (Me-
dina, J., dissenting) (describing the trial court’s role as “gatekeeper” regarding the
admission of expert testimony); Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654,
666–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
226. McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds, 180 S.W.3d 183, 199 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005,
pet. denied).
227. Simmons & Ritter, supra note 3, at 775.
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mined that a party can breach its duty to preserve evidence intention-
ally or negligently,228 the Brookshire Court apparently sought to
deviate from Justice Baker’s framework in one important respect.
Under Justice Baker’s framework, a party is entitled to a spoliation
remedy only after the trial court finds prejudice—that the missing evi-
dence hinders the nonspoliator’s ability to present its case or de-
fense.229 By contrast, the Brookshire Court eliminated the prejudice
prong as it relates to the initial finding of spoliation.230 Instead, under
Brookshire, the trial court analyzes prejudice only when determining
an appropriate, proportionate remedy.231 Nevertheless, the Brook-
shire Court approved Justice Baker’s factors for determining
prejudice, including the missing evidence’s relevancy to key issues, the
likely effect of the evidence in the case, the spoliator’s culpability, and
whether the missing evidence was cumulative of other available evi-
dence.232 Likewise, both frameworks require a finding of prejudice in
order to afford any remedy and before the judge can give a spoliation
instruction to the jury, with the goal of tailoring the remedy to cure
the prejudice.233 As such, this deviation is more a change in form than
in substance.
3. A Mandatory Spoliation Instruction
According to the dissent, Brookshire also deviates from Justice
Baker’s framework in the application of the spoliation instruction.234
Specifically, the dissent argued that a trial judge could historically sub-
mit a variety of spoliation instructions—including those permitting
and mandating the jury to rely on the spoliation presumption and
those allowing the jury to find spoliation.235 According to the dissent,
Brookshire mandates one instruction—that the court has found spoli-
ation and the jury must presume the evidence is harmful.236
Justice Baker’s framework included two different jury instructions,
depending on the severity of prejudice resulting from spoliation.237 As
explained in Part III, Section A, the two spoliation jury instructions
available under Justice Baker’s framework are rebuttable presump-
tion and adverse presumption instructions.238 However, these instruc-
228. Compare Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 956–57 (Baker, J., concurring),
with Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 20–21 (Tex. 2014).
229. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 958.
230. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 21 n.9 (describing Justice Baker’s “two-step analy-
sis” for analyzing prejudice in the spoliation finding and when imposing a remedy as
“unnecessary”).
231. Id. at 21.
232. Id. at 22.
233. Compare Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 959, with Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 21.
234. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 33 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 34.
237. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 960.
238. Id. at 960–61.
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tions operate to vary the burden of proof and do not mandate a
permissive or mandatory instruction. Even more, one of the cases the
dissent cited to support that juries should determine whether the spo-
liation was intentional came before Justice Baker’s Trevino concur-
rence,239 minimizing its value to the analysis. Further, that court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the spolia-
tion instruction.240 Likewise, in the other case cited by the dissent, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in submitting the
spoliation instruction and reversed.241 Thus, neither case endorses in-
structions allowing the jury to decide on the spoliation issue. Moreo-
ver, the Brookshire Court never expressly mandated one type of
spoliation instruction over another; it merely mandated the circum-
stances in which a judge may present any type of spoliation instruc-
tion. At this point, there is no reason to believe that a trial judge
cannot choose between either of Justice Baker’s spoliation instruc-
tions. A spoliation instruction simply cannot put the issue of whether
spoliation has occurred in the jury’s hands, which aligns with the mat-
ter historically being in the judge’s domain.242
4. The Purpose of Spoliation Law: Compensatory or Punitive?
Brookshire and Justice Baker’s framework highlight that the histori-
cal purpose behind spoliation law is compensatory rather than puni-
tive.243 This is consistent with the Court’s previous holdings, including
Wal-Mart Stores v. Johnson, where the Court noted that the purpose
of spoliation remedies are “to restore the parties to a rough approxi-
mation of their positions if all evidence were available.”244 Both
frameworks seek to balance the harm to the nonspoliator with the
severe effects of harsh sanctions such as dismissal and the spoliation
instruction. This is because “an unfortunate consequence of submit-
ting a spoliation instruction is that it ‘often ends litigation’ because ‘it
is too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator to overcome.’”245 Of course,
239. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 33 (citing Ordonez v. M.W. McCurdy & Co., 984
S.W.2d 264, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)).
240. Ordonez, 984 S.W.2d at 274.
241. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 33 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106
S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. 2003)).
242. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954 (Baker, J., concurring) (citing Miller v. Stout, 706
S.W.2d 785, 787–88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ) (“Only ultimate issues of
fact are to be submitted to a jury. . . . Such proceedings as those involving determina-
tion of motions for sanctions because of failure to respond to discovery requests . . .
often involve resolution [by a judge] of questions of fact.” (alterations in original))).
243. Compare Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 17 (explaining that a spoliation instruction
“is given to compensate for the absence of evidence that a party had a duty to pre-
serve”), with Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 954 (“When evidence spoliation prejudices non-
spoliating parties, courts can levy a sanction or submit a presumption that levels the
evidentiary playing field and compensates the nonspoliating party.”).
244. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d at 721.
245. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 17 (citing Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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if the nonspoliator is unable to present its claims or defenses due to
missing evidence, the judicial system’s truth-seeking function becomes
impossible. However, the spoliation instruction necessarily presumes
some wrongdoing by the spoliator, so if a party is not completely de-
prived of presenting its claims, it is reasonable to require intent or bad
faith before permitting the harshest sanctions. Moreover, courts risk
violating the Due Process clause when they prevent a party from hav-
ing the merits of its case adjudicated by imposing the harshest discov-
ery sanctions.246 The Brookshire Court and Justice Baker sought to
mitigate these risks by making the question of spoliation a matter of
law for the judge, keeping evidence of spoliation away from the jury,
to keep the jury’s focus on the merits and away from the parties’ pre-
trial misconduct. Likewise, both frameworks mitigate these risks by
imposing a proportionality requirement—that the sanction directly re-
late to the conduct giving rise to the sanction and must not be
excessive.
Although the Brookshire spoliation framework deviates from past
spoliation law in some ways, the framework is not much more than a
revived variation of Justice Baker’s spoliation framework that seeks to
balance the unfairness caused by missing evidence with the harsh ef-
fects caused by shifting the jury’s focus away from the merits to the
litigant’s conduct during discovery. Moreover, Brookshire’s focus on
compensatory rather than punitive objectives directly aligns with the
historical purposes behind spoliation law.
B. Rendering Willful Blindness Meaningless
The dissent asserted that Brookshire might permit the destruction
of relevant evidence so long as the spoliator acts in compliance with a
stated retention policy.247 Specifically, Justice Guzman argued that the
Court failed to find willful blindness where Brookshire allowed the
surveillance footage to erase with knowledge of the fall, of Aldridge’s
claim, and of Aldridge’s request for a copy, and where the employee
responsible for the footage admitted that he knew the footage would
be key to Aldridge’s slip-and-fall claim.248 Because the Court did not
find willful blindness, there is significant merit to the dissent’s argu-
ment that the Court’s application of the new rule opens the door for
defendants to destroy relevant evidence in the name of a document
retention policy, despite the notice of circumstances likely to give rise
to future litigation.249 Moreover, the Court’s holding sends a message
246. TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917–18 (Tex. 1991)
(discussing the constitutional limitations on the power of courts to adjudicate a party’s
claims without regard to the merits and instead based on a party’s conduct in
discovery).
247. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 31 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 36–37.
249. Id. at 38.
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to trial and appellate judges that it strongly disfavors spoliation in-
structions and that lower courts should be extremely cautious in grant-
ing such a severe remedy.
1. What is Willful Blindness?
One acts intentionally when he desires to cause the consequences of
his act or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it.250 It is also a well-established principle that a party may
not intentionally bury his head in the sand to avoid obtaining basic
knowledge.251 In other words, if there is knowledge that a person
could and should have, but somehow the party manages not to have it,
then the law deems that the party chose ignorance by his own willful
blindness.252 The Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction on willful
blindness is instructive. It states, “You may find that a defendant had
knowledge of a fact if you find that the defendant deliberately closed
his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. . . .
[K]nowledge can be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded
himself to the existence of a fact.”253 It follows that two elements must
be shown. First, the party must have some subjective awareness of a
high probability of the existence of the fact.254 Second, the party must
have purposely contrived to avoid learning the fact.255
2. A Deeper Look at the Brookshire Court’s Application
of the New Framework
The Brookshire majority assumed that Brookshire breached an ex-
isting duty to preserve a longer portion of the video and that its failure
to do so harmed Aldridge’s case.256 By contrast, this Note starts its
analysis from the beginning of the framework and works through
every step.
250. Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Nugent v. Pilgrim’s Pride
Corp., 30 S.W.3d 562, 575 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (holding that
trespass is intentional if “while the actor did not know his conduct would result in a
trespass, his actions were practically certain to have that effect”).
251. Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1899) (explaining that an “evil de-
sign may be presumed if the [actor] purposely keeps himself in ignorance”); Bonner v.
Stephens, 60 Tex. 616, 619 (1884) (“[I]f there be any ‘wilful blindness,’—‘any turning
away from evidence,’ the party will be charged with notice.”).
252. See Bonner, 60 Tex. at 619.
253. FIFTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
COMMITTEE, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CASES § 1.37A (2012), http://
www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/fifth/crim2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/6U66-
BMGG].
254. See, e.g., United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990).
255. Id.
256. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 27 (Tex. 2014).
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Under Brookshire, a spoliation inquiry commences with a finding of
duty, which includes both timing and scope.257 First, the duty to pre-
serve evidence is only triggered once litigation becomes reasonably
foreseeable.258 Second, the scope of that duty is limited to evidence in
the party’s possession or control that will be material and relevant to
that foreseeable claim.259 As explained above, the Texas Rules of Evi-
dence defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.260 Once the party moving for the spoliation
sanction satisfies this requirement, the movant must demonstrate that
the other party breached its duty to preserve evidence.261
Applying these rules to Brookshire, the record demonstrates that
Brookshire breached its duty to preserve material and relevant evi-
dence after litigation was reasonably foreseeable. First, Brookshire’s
argument that it did not anticipate litigation is without merit because,
most likely, Brookshire would not have retained any video whatso-
ever or offered to pay Aldridge’s medical expenses if it did not antici-
pate a chance of litigation.262 Moreover, Gilmer’s (Brookshire’s Vice
President of Human Resources and Risk Management) testimony that
he “didn’t know there was going to be a case”263 is irrelevant—Brook-
shire’s duty to preserve the tape arose when it reasonably should have
known that there was a substantial chance, meaning “more than
merely an abstract possibility or unwarranted fear,” that a claim
would be filed and that evidence in its possession or control would be
material and relevant to that claim.264 Thus, it is clear that Brookshire
breached its duty to preserve relevant evidence by allowing the re-
maining footage to erase automatically.
The next question goes to remedy. To warrant a spoliation instruc-
tion, the spoliator must have intentionally destroyed the evidence, or
the missing evidence must have been so important that, without it, the
other side is completely prevented from proving its case.
Interestingly, when the majority analyzed Brookshire’s culpability,
it did not consider the reasonableness of Brookshire’s data retention
257. Id. at 20.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. TEX. R. EVID. 401.
261. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 20.
262. Id. at 16; see also Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 463 (arguing that Brookshire’s
preservation duty arose “at the latest, when [it] authorized the medical expenses to be
paid, in an amount above and beyond its usual policy”).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 20 (quoting Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204 (Tex.
1993)); see also Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concur-
ring) (“A party should not be able to subvert the discovery process and the fair ad-
ministration of justice simply by destroying evidence before a claim is actually filed.”).
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policy.265 However, the majority did say that it was “in no way sug-
gesting that parties may immunize themselves from the consequences
of evidence spoliation by hiding behind unreasonable limited duration
retention policies.”266 The Court rationalized that the reasonableness
of Brookshire’s policy was not at issue,267 but it flows from the bene-
fits of data retention policies, which make parties “less likely to hand
over incriminating evidence,”268 that this would be relevant in assess-
ing Brookshire’s intent to conceal or destroy discoverable evidence.269
Indeed, the dissent implied that the data retention practices should be
part of the culpability determination as evidence of willful blindness,
and, therefore, intent.
Regardless of the reasonableness of Brookshire’s retention policy,
the evidence shows that Brookshire intended to deprive Aldridge of
the full recording. First, Brookshire is quite familiar with slip-and-fall
litigation.270 In fact, during his testimony, Gilmer confirmed his under-
standing that a key issue in a slip-and-fall case is whether store em-
ployees knew or should have known there was something on the floor
that caused the fall.271 Further, Gilmer knew that any video not saved
would be overwritten.272 Despite this knowledge, he specifically in-
structed the employee to review the video from the time of the fall
and save five or six minutes before the fall, blinding himself as to what
any other footage would have shown.273 Moreover, on September 29,
the same day Gilmer rejected Aldridge’s request for the full tape,
Brookshire offered to pay for “a visit with a neurosurgeon and several
weeks of physical therapy,” which was beyond Brookshire’s routine
practice.274 This occurred days before the footage automatically
erased and concurrently with Brookshire’s refusal to provide Aldridge
265. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 27 n.19. It is important to note that the Court does
not seem to see a distinction between Brookshire’s thirty-day deletion standard oper-
ating practice and a stated data retention policy. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. FERRIS, supra note 25, at 2.
269. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 24.
270. See, e.g., Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.3d 406, 407 (Tex. 2006)
(plaintiff slipped and fell on a piece of partially melted ice on the floor in front of a
self-service soft drink dispenser in a Brookshire grocery store); Bowman v. Brook-
shire Grocery Co., 317 S.W.3d 500, 501 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010, pet. denied) (plaintiff
tripped on a floor mat placed near the exit and fell in a Brookshire grocery store);
Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Goss, 208 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006),
rev’d, 262 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2008) (plaintiff-employee tripped over a lowboy cart while
working in a Brookshire grocery store); Akin v. Brookshire Grocery Co., No. 05-99-
01067-CV, 2001 WL 88194, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2001, no pet.) (plaintiff
slipped and fell on a pink liquid that was spilled on the floor of the deli area of a
Brookshire’s grocery store) (not designated for publication).
271. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 16.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 31 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
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with a copy of the video, clearly showing that Brookshire at one point
intended to deprive Aldridge of the footage.275
Because the Court did not find intent, many of its findings ignore
the “presumption that the missing evidence would be unfavorable to
the spoliator.”276 However, judge or jury, it is within the factfinder’s
domain to decide whether to believe that Brookshire only viewed
eight minutes of footage.277 The factfinder (i.e., the trial court judge)
could have determined that Brookshire did watch the footage. It was
also within the factfinder’s discretion to determine that Brookshire
did not watch it to avoid seeing what it contained. The majority ac-
cused the dissent of speculating about what the remaining footage
might have showed and discounted its value due to the low quality of
the footage.278 However, given that spoliation victims can prove the
contents of missing evidence through circumstantial evidence,279 it
should have been within the fact-finding judge’s discretion on remand
to speculate about the contents of the missing footage—something a
judge must do when evidence is missing. But here, the majority sup-
planted its own opinion about the contents of the missing evidence as
a matter of law while reviewing for an abuse of discretion.
Finally, the majority itself explained in a footnote that “in the con-
text of automatic electronic deletion systems. . . . [a] party with control
over one of these systems who intentionally allows relevant informa-
tion to be erased can hardly be said to have only negligently destroyed
evidence.”280 Brookshire controlled the video recording system and
intentionally preserved eight minutes of footage, knowing the remain-
ing footage would overwrite less than thirty days later. Even more, the
fact that Brookshire consciously chose to maintain some of the foot-
age provides greater evidence that it intended to deprive Aldridge of
the remaining footage, irrespective of willful blindness. This seems to
fall squarely within the Court’s footnote, yet the Court did not find
intentional spoliation. Instead, the only way to reconcile this footnote
with the rest of the Court’s opinion is to infer that the Court did not
find the missing footage prejudicial.281
275. Id. at 15 (majority opinion); see also Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 468–69 (re-
viewing the facts described above and concluding that it “constituted at least some
evidence that Brookshire Brothers allowed the remaining video footage to be written
over in a deliberate effort to hide relevant evidence”).
276. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. 2003).
277. See Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 16.
278. Id. at 28 n.21.
279. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Tex. 2002).
280. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 24 n.17 (emphasis added).
281. But see Hoffman, supra note 4, at 272 (resolving the gap in the Court’s analysis
by concluding “that a finding of ‘willful blindness’ also requires a showing that the
spoliating party had a ‘subjective purpose’ to conceal or destroy relevant evidence”).
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3. Blending the Culpability and Prejudice Requirements
Perhaps the Court meant to hold that Brookshire intentionally
spoliated evidence but found that Aldridge was not prejudiced be-
cause the eight-minute tape was preserved.282 The Court explained
that many other sources of information were available for Aldridge’s
use at trial.283 Moreover, the Court seemed to place great weight on
the poor quality and obscured visibility of the footage and indicated
that these facts somehow refuted any presumption of harm.284 In con-
trast to the Court’s finding of no intent, one could reasonably infer
that Aldridge did not suffer sufficient prejudice—that sufficient evi-
dence was available for Aldridge to use in proving his case.285
On the other hand, the video Brookshire did save indicates that the
absence of the remaining footage was prejudicial. As recognized by
the Court, the video showed store employees walking past the area
before Aldridge fell and an employee signaling for help shortly after
the fall.286 If Brookshire would have saved more of the video, the jury
might have seen when the spill occurred, how many employees walked
by the area prior to Aldridge’s fall, or the amount of effort required to
clean up the spill, and therefore, the size of the spill area.287 These are
all reasonable inferences stemming from the eight-minute video and
are far from speculative in nature. Certainly, this is not irreparable
harm warranting the narrow exception for negligent spoliation, but
can one say that the poor video quality alone could defeat the spolia-
tion presumption or that Aldridge was not somewhat prejudiced? This
appears to be the position taken by Judge Rodriguez.288
Because of the plethora of other available evidence to show that
Brookshire employees had constructive knowledge of the spill, the
Court was correct to refuse a spoliation instruction. This comports
with the compensatory rather than punitive purposes underlying spoli-
282. But, the majority said, “there is no evidence that [Brookshire] did so with the
requisite intent to conceal or destroy relevant evidence . . . .” Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d
at 27.
283. Id. at 28.
284. Id. at 29.
285. In fact, the Court’s analysis seems to directly align with Justice Baker’s
prejudice prong from his concurring opinion in Trevino that has been almost univer-
sally adopted by Texas courts. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 957–58 (Tex. 1998)
(Baker, J., concurring) (recommending that courts consider the relevancy of the ab-
sent evidence and the availability of cumulative evidence when determining the sever-
ity of prejudice). Moreover, in 2010, the First District Court of Appeals affirmed a
trial court’s refusal to find prejudice under almost the exact same facts. Clark v.
Randalls Food, 317 S.W.3d 351, 359–60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no
pet.).
286. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 30.
287. Id. at 32 n.4 (Guzman, J., dissenting); see also Clark, 317 S.W.3d at 358 (hold-
ing that the defendant knew surveillance footage was relevant even though the re-
cording did not show the floor where shopper fell because it could show, inter alia,
whether someone else slipped or almost slipped in the hour before the plaintiff fell).
288. Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 470–74.
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ation law. First, the available footage—showing the fall, several min-
utes before the fall, and one minute after the fall—was shown to the
jury at trial.289 Second, Aldridge presented Brookshire’s incident re-
port confirming “that Aldridge had slipped in grease that leaked out
of a container by the Grab–N–Go located near the area of the fall.”290
Third, Aldridge himself testified about the circumstances surrounding
his fall.291 Fourth, and most importantly, the footage the jury watched
at trial showed Brookshire employees walking by Grab–N–Go min-
utes before Aldridge fell and “an employee signaling for help to clean
up the spill right before the video ended, suggesting that the spill was
too large to be cleaned [using] paper towels.”292 This shows that the
employee that walked by the spill minutes before Aldridge fell should
have attempted to clean it up or stood guard over it to ensure that a
customer would not slip. Moreover, the store manager testified that
substances should not reasonably remain on the floor for longer than
five minutes without an employee noticing and cleaning it up.293 Thus,
not only was Aldridge not “wholly deprived” from presenting his
claim, he had ample evidence to establish that Brookshire had actual
notice of a seemingly large spill five minutes before the fall—an un-
reasonable amount of time per the store manager’s testimony.
It is difficult to understand why the Brookshire majority did not find
willful blindness, but even if it had, the facts of the case did not war-
rant a spoliation instruction because Aldridge did not suffer sufficient
prejudice. However, because the Court did not rely on the more prac-
tical ground, there is significant merit to the dissent’s argument that
Brookshire opens the door for litigants to destroy relevant evidence in
the name of a document retention policy despite anticipating future
litigation.294 Moreover, the holding certainly highlights the Court’s
strong reluctance to uphold spoliation instructions—sending a mes-
sage to lower courts to be vigilant in granting severe spoliation in-
structions in only the most extreme circumstances.
C. What is a “Reasonable” Data Retention Policy?
As mentioned above, the majority did not consider the reasonable-
ness of Brookshire’s data retention policy when it analyzed whether
Brookshire had intentionally deprived Aldridge of relevant evi-
dence.295 In addition to the dissent’s criticisms, legal commentators
have complained that, in not considering the reasonableness of
Brookshire’s policy, the Court missed an opportunity to provide data
289. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 28.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 30.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 37–38 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 27 n.19 (majority opinion).
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preservation guidelines to those accumulating voluminous records or
other potential evidence as part of normal operations.296 In fact, Texas
courts have been silent on this question.297 However, federal law
speaking directly on the issue, which both the Brookshire majority and
dissent referenced, is instructive and provides particularly reliable gui-
dance to potential litigants.
In 1988, the Eighth Circuit enumerated a framework for determin-
ing the reasonableness of a document retention policy when deciding
Lewy v. Remington Arms.298 In Lewy, a firearms manufacturer ap-
pealed the lower court’s submission of an adverse inference jury in-
struction based on the company’s inability to produce certain
documents, including information about customer complaints, which it
had destroyed pursuant to its record retention policy that had been in
place for more than a decade.299 Under Remington’s policy, informa-
tion was kept for three years, and if no action regarding a particular
record was taken during that period, it was destroyed.300 Although the
court lacked the necessary findings to make a decision, it remanded,
instructing the district court to consider: (1) whether the retention pe-
riod was reasonable in relation to the particular record; (2) whether
lawsuits concerning the complaints at issue had been filed; (3) the fre-
quency and magnitude of similar complaints; and (4) whether the doc-
ument retention policy was instituted in bad faith or, in other words,
with intent to deprive another of relevant evidence.301 Since Lewy,
other federal courts have added requirements that the company fol-
low its document retention policy in a reasonably consistent man-
ner302 and suspend the policy, implementing a litigation hold to ensure
296. Sullivan, supra note 6 (“Although the court implicitly acknowledges that in-
definite data retention is impractical, it offers no guidance on how long to preserve
potential evidence if there is otherwise no objective notice of potential litigation.”);
Zach Wolfe, Key Issues When Employees Leave to Compete, HOUS. LAW., Jan.–Feb.
2015, at 30, 32, http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/past.html; Hoffman, supra note 4,
at 273 (“Given that a number of businesses have enacted video-retention policies,
appellate courts will likely have to evaluate the relative merits of these policies in the
context of alleged spoliation in the near future.”); see also Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at
27 n.19.
297. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. 2015); Brook-
shire, 438 S.W.3d 9; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. 2003);
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring); Doe v.
Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)
(refusing to find spoliation when alleged spoliator did so in the regular course of busi-
ness); Aguirre v. S. Texas Blood & Tissue Ctr., 2 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (same).
298. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988).
299. Id. at 1111.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1112.
302. See, e.g., Day v. LSI Corp., No. CIV 11-186-TUC-CKJ, 2012 WL 6674434, at
*16 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2012); Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 490
(S.D. Fla. 1984).
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preservation, when litigation becomes reasonably foreseeable.303
However, the Lewy court also explained that even reasonable data
retention policies may give rise to intentional spoliation in particular
circumstances, explaining that parties cannot “blindly destroy docu-
ments and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous document
retention policy.”304
Alternatively, the Texas Supreme Court could rely on the Advisory
Committee’s Notes to the upcoming amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 37(e).305 The Notes state that the Rule focuses
on a party’s failure to take “reasonable steps to preserve” digital in-
formation as opposed to singling out data destruction policies.306 The
Notes also state that the Committee intends to continue with the old
safe-harbor provision, which treated the “routine, good-faith opera-
tion of an electronic information system” as a factor in considering
whether reasonable steps were taken to preserve the evidence, with
the caveat that “the prospect of litigation may” require the suspension
or modification of routine destruction practices.307 Additionally, the
Notes list as factors: (1) the sophistication of the parties with regard to
evaluating preservation efforts in litigation; (2) the extent to which the
parties knew of and protected against casualty losses outside the
party’s control; and (3) the parties’ staff and financial resources availa-
ble to devote to preservation efforts in proportion to the effectiveness
of other alternatives.308
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the
boundaries of a reasonable data retention policy, despite the opportu-
nity to do so in Brookshire, the majority’s desire to align with the
proposed Rule 37(e) amendments and the dissent’s appraisal of Lewy
gives litigants at least some insight into the Court’s expectations.309
Moreover, both approaches provide the flexibility necessary to tailor
remedies to the circumstances of each case and preserve a significant
degree of judicial discretion rather than enumerating rigid rules. Fi-
nally, given that the majority did not consider the reasonableness of
Brookshire’s data retention practices relevant to the issue of culpabil-
ity,310 the better question is whether the policy’s reasonableness indi-
cates culpability whatsoever as opposed to evidence of reasonable
care in the breach determination.311
303. See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 255 F.R.D. 135, 148 (D. Del. 2009)
(citing Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
304. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112.
305. See generally SEPT. 2014 APPENDIX, supra note 125, at 38.
306. Id. at 40.
307. Id. at 41.
308. Id. at 41–42.
309. Compare Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 22, 24 (Tex. 2014) (align-
ing the prejudice and intent requirements with the Federal Rules (plus a narrow negli-
gence caveat)), with id. at 38 (Guzman, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 27 n.19 (majority opinion).
311. Id. at 20.
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D. Should Courts Defer to the Rulemaking Process?
The Brookshire dissent, Judge Scheindlin, and Judge Rodriguez be-
lieve that courts should defer to the rulemaking process in creating
spoliation rules.312 They reason that, because spoliation is an eviden-
tiary concept and discovery issue with far-reaching impacts, spoliation
issues should be resolved through the rulemaking process with input
from the Rules Advisory Committee to provide uniformity and preci-
sion that is otherwise lacking when the Court limits itself to facts of
one case.313 However, while it is true that rulemaking is the route cho-
sen by the federal courts, which defer to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, rulemaking does not necessarily pro-
duce the best, most complete outcome for the facts of every case. In
fact, Judge Scheindlin has recently outlined many shortcomings in the
proposed changes to Rule 37(e).314 Ultimately, courts must fill the
gaps left open by the rulemaking process, and no Texas Rule currently
addresses the nuances involved with spoliation.315 Although rulemak-
ing will likely produce beneficial results, the Brookshire Court had to
resolve the issues before it in the absence of a rule on point. Finally,
the Court will save valuable resources by continuing to observe the
results of the federal rulemaking process and implementing parts of
those rules once officially enacted and vetted in unique, real-world
contexts.
To summarize this Part, the Brookshire majority took a conserva-
tive approach to spoliation—restricting “death-penalty sanctions”
such as dismissal of claims and spoliation instructions to narrowly de-
fined circumstances.316 The framework clearly attempts to balance the
harsh effects of these litigation-ending sanctions with the remedial
purposes behind spoliation law.317 Moreover, the framework signifi-
cantly aligns with the upcoming Rule 37(e) amendments while also
providing a narrow exception for negligent spoliation.318 This Part has
shown that, contrary to the dissent and Judge Rodriguez’s criticisms,
the framework itself is not a significant change from Justice Baker’s
Trevino concurrence, which a majority of Texas courts had adopted
prior to Brookshire. At the same time, the Court’s application of the
framework to the Brookshire facts motivates lower courts to exercise
extreme caution when deciding to present a spoliation instruction to
the jury. It is troubling that the majority did not find willful blindness
despite the persuasive evidence of such conduct, especially given that
312. Id. at 38 (Guzman, J., dissenting); Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1308;
Rodriguez, supra note 6, at 481.
313. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 38–39 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 31).
314. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 7, at 1301–02, 1314–15.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 23 (majority opinion).
317. Id.
318. Compare SEPT. 2014 APPENDIX, supra note 125, at 38–43, with Brookshire, 438
S.W.3d at 24–25 n.17.
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it could have reached the same outcome without creating any confu-
sion by finding that the cumulative evidence was so abundant that a
spoliation instruction was not called for despite Brookshire’s intent to
deprive Aldridge of evidence. Likewise, it is unclear why the Court
did not consider the reasonableness of Brookshire’s retention policy
when analyzing intent. Unfortunately, these missteps will likely moti-
vate courts to deny spoliation instructions and entice litigants to de-
stroy evidence without fearing the harshest sanctions.
VI. SUBSEQUENT BROOKSHIRE INTERPRETATIONS
Courts have applied the Brookshire framework to a handful of new
fact patterns. Although the specific issues in those cases have not re-
quired courts to confront significant open questions or interpret the
framework’s perplexing nuances, they share one commonality—the
denial or reversal of a severe spoliation sanction.319 It appears that the
post-Brookshire era might be one where the spoliation instruction, or
any other harsh spoliation sanction, becomes a rarity.
Two appellate court applications of the Brookshire framework in
which a spoliation sanction was refused are worthy of special mention.
First, in IQ Holdings v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., the First District
Court of Appeals analyzed whether a trial court abused its discretion
in denying a plaintiff’s motion for spoliation sanctions.320 IQ sued its
title insurer and escrow agent for damages sustained in relation to the
sale of a condominium unit.321 During pretrial discovery, IQ moved
for spoliation sanctions against both defendants, but the trial court
denied IQ’s motion.322 Stewart Title had a document retention policy
that called for the destruction of its hard copy closing file but required
its employees to preserve “all the pertinent data” in a system called
FileStor.323 IQ alleged that Stewart Title did not preserve all of the
hardcopy documents in FileStor.324 However, Stewart Title also used
another electronic file retention system called SureClose, where all of
319. See, e.g., Petrol. Sols., Inc. v. Head, 454 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Tex. 2014) (extending
Brookshire’s restrictions on the spoliation instruction remedy to other “death-penalty
sanctions,” such as striking a party’s claims or affirmative defenses, and reiterating
that determining whether spoliation has occurred and crafting an appropriate curative
remedy are questions of law for the trial court and that evidence relating to the cir-
cumstances of the alleged spoliation is generally inadmissible at trial); Bazan v.
Munoz, 444 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet. h.) (upholding the
trial court’s denial of a spoliation sanction and noting that the alleged spoliator testi-
fied that he had removed the business receipts from company file cabinets to take
them to his accountant well before filing the lawsuit and that it would not have been
in his best interest to destroy those receipts from a tax liability standpoint).
320. IQ Holdings, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 451 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet. h.).
321. Id. at 865.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 866.
324. Id.
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the sales documents were allegedly stored.325 On appeal, the court
held that the documents in the closing file were potentially relevant to
IQ’s claims and that the employee had a duty to preserve them.326
However, when the court reached the issue of breach, it found that
Stewart Title had produced a copy of the title commitment that it had
preserved in SureClose.327 IQ responded that the document was a
fabricated copy, noting some suspect inconsistencies, but the court
held that the trial court reasonably could have accepted Stewart Ti-
tle’s explanations for the inconsistencies and found that the document
was genuine.328 Thus, the court ultimately concluded that the trial
court could have reasonably determined that Stewart Title did not
breach its duty to preserve.329 The court also noted that the existence
of the SureClose records also supported a finding that IQ did not suf-
fer any prejudice from the destruction of the hard copy files.330
The second notable case is the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion in Flagstar Bank v. Walker.331 In Flagstar, the appellate court up-
held the trial court’s denial of a spoliation instruction where the
defendant made evidence unavailable by replacing its servers shortly
before the case was filed without first backing up the data.332 Notably,
in denying the plaintiff’s spoliation instruction request, the trial judge
said, “It’s just too hard of a burden to meet and I don’t think it was
met here.”333 Very much like the Brookshire holding, the appeals
court held that there was no proof that the defendants had intention-
ally concealed evidence. But the court did not discuss this finding and
instead based its decision on a lack of relevancy and the possibility
that the evidence would have been cumulative of other available
evidence.334
The Texas Supreme Court recently applied the Brookshire frame-
work in Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez.335 Wackenhut was the owner
and operator of a charter bus that collided with a car driven by Gu-
tierrez. The bus was equipped with four video cameras that recorded
while the bus was running, and one camera located outside the pas-
senger door was positioned so that it might have captured the im-
pact.336 The cameras automatically looped over and erased previously
325. Id.
326. Id. at 868.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 868–69.
329. Id. at 869.
330. Id. at 869 n.4.
331. Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Walker, 451 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no
pet. h.).
332. Id. at 506.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 507.
335. Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
336. Id. at 918.
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recorded data every seven days.337 Two days after the accident, Gu-
tierrez delivered a letter to Wackenhut recounting his memory of the
accident and asserting that Wackenhut’s driver was at fault.338 He also
completed a notice and claim form that was sent with the letter to
Wackenhut’s corporate headquarters.339 Despite this, Wackenhut did
not preserve the recording, and it automatically erased after seven
days.340 Two years after the accident, Gutierrez sued Wackenhut and
the driver for negligence.341 Gutierrez filed a pretrial motion for spoli-
ation of evidence, requesting that the judge impose a spoliation jury
instruction against Wackenhut.342 At the close of Gutierrez’s case-in-
chief, the trial court ruled that Wackenhut had negligently spoliated
evidence and granted the requested spoliation instruction.343 The
charge submitted read:
Parties to a lawsuit are under a duty to preserve evidence that they
know or should know is relevant to the dispute. In this case, The
Wackenhut Corporation negligently failed to preserve the video on
the bus, and it did so while there was an anticipation of litigation
and while it had a duty to preserve evidence. You may, therefore,
presume that the videotape was unfavorable to The Wackenhut
Corporation.”344
The jury found in Gutierrez’s favor, and the trial court rendered a $1.2
million judgment.345 Wackenhut petitioned the Texas Supreme Court
for review after the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed, argu-
ing that the trial court abused its discretion in submitting the instruc-
tion.346 The Court explained that the trial court’s finding of negligent
spoliation included an express finding that Wackenhut had not inten-
tionally destroyed the video.347 As a result, the Court considered only
whether Wackenhut irreparably deprived Gutierrez of any meaningful
ability to present a claim or defense.348 The Court found that other
competent evidence existed such that Gutierrez was not irreparably
deprived of presenting his claims and held that the trial court had
abused its discretion.349 Specifically, the Court noted that Gutierrez
had available at trial: (1) both drivers’ testimony; (2) the testimony of
an eyewitness Wackenhut employee; (3) their corresponding state-





341. Id. at 919.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 919 n.2 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
345. Id. at 919.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 921 n.4.
348. Id. at 921.
349. Id.
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sponding police officer; (5) the police report; (6) Wackenhut’s report
to its corporate headquarters; and (7) photos of the vehicles and the
accident scene.350 Finally, the Court held that the trial court’s error
likely resulted in an improper judgment and remanded for a new trial
because of the highly contested liability, counsel’s courtroom state-
ments referencing the missing recording, and the recording’s “highly
speculative probative value” because it was 8:00 p.m. and raining at
the time.351
Ultimately, it does not appear that courts have had trouble applying
Brookshire. These cases illustrate, however, that parties seeking a spo-
liation jury instruction face substantial obstacles when attempting to
satisfy the new framework. They also indicate that the Texas Supreme
Court and Texas appellate courts are very apprehensive about issuing
spoliation instructions. For example, Wackenhut shows that a negli-
gent spoliation instruction is only appropriate in the most exceptional
circumstances and that “differences in kind and quality between the
available evidence and the spoliated evidence”352 are not truly key
factors in analyzing prejudice because the testimony of interested wit-
nesses—including the spoliator’s own employees—and documents
prepared by the spoliator’s agents can serve as competent evidence
for the spoliating victim to prove his case.353 Further, IQ Holdings
indicates that even allegedly fabricated and altered copies of relevant
evidence can serve as competent evidence, precluding a party from
showing the prejudice necessary for a negligent spoliation instruc-
tion.354 Moreover, Wackenhut and Flagstar show that, following
Brookshire, lower courts are not likely to find intentional spoliation
when related to an automatic destruction system, adding greater
weight to the Brookshire dissent’s argument that the new framework
may permit spoliation when done in accordance with a data retention
policy.355
On the other hand, Wackenhut shows that the Brookshire dissent’s
argument that the framework forces judges into one mandatory spoli-
ation instruction was overstated.356 The trial court in Wackenhut did
not give a mandatory instruction and instead instructed the jury that it
may presume the evidence was harmful; on review, the Court did not
350. Id.
351. Id. at 922. Apparently Chief Justice Roberts is wrong; a picture is not worth a
thousand words. See FCC v. CBS Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2677, 2678 (2012).
352. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 22 (Tex. 2014).
353. Compare Wackenhut, 453 S.W.3d at 921, with Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 22, 28.
354. IQ Holdings, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 451 S.W.3d 861, 868–69 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet. h.).
355. Wackenhut, 453 S.W.3d at 921; Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Walker, 451 S.W.3d 490,
506 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet. h.); Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 31, 38 (Guzman,
J., dissenting).
356. Compare Wackenhut, 453 S.W.3d at 919 n.2., with Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at
34 (Guzman, J. dissenting).
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correct or otherwise discuss the instruction’s language.357 But irre-
spective of the distinctions between permissive and mandatory spolia-
tion presumptions in the actual jury charge, these cases show that it
has become exceedingly difficult for parties to reach the issue of what
language to use in the spoliation instruction.
VII. LOOKING AHEAD: THE FUTURE OF SPOLIATION
IN THE ESI CONTEXT
Courts continue attempting to strike a balance between the harsh
trial effects of destroyed evidence and the significant burdens of main-
taining voluminous amounts of data. Because of the vast expansion in
spoliation motions since the early 2000s, businesses face high costs in
implementing and maintaining data retention systems to store other-
wise unnecessary documents, which they claim to keep only out of
fear of spoliation sanctions.358 However, this ignores the real differ-
ences between paper and electronic storage, the costs of each, the gen-
uine reasons why businesses are storing more data electronically, and
the operational and technological advances in data retention practices.
Nevertheless, courts and rule makers have started down the path of
appeasing lawyers and businesses that argue against these allegedly
burdensome and overreaching preservation obligations, ignoring the
realities that led to the rise of sanctions for the destruction of evidence
in the first place.
A key driver for the rise of ESI is that the cost per gigabyte of data
storage has gone down by half every fourteen months over the past
thirty years.359 For example, one gigabyte of storage cost nearly
$105,000 in 1985 but fell to $1,120 in 1995, to $1.24 in 2005, and to
$0.03 in 2014.360 By contrast, storing just one cubic foot of records in
paper form is estimated to cost over $30 per year when stored onsite
357. Wackenhut, 453 S.W.3d at 919 n.2.
358. Creighton Magid, New Discovery Rules to Rein in Litigation Expenses, CORPO-
RATE COUNSEL (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202674945208/New-
Discovery-Rules-to-Rein-in-Litigation-Expenses#ixzz3IQAcS6QD [http://perma.cc/
J39V-TY4Y] (“A report issued earlier this year by professor William Hubbard of the
University of Chicago Law School pegged the ‘fixed’ cost of implementing hardware
and software systems to preserve electronic data to be $2.5 million per year for large
companies, and the additional, lawsuit-specific costs of preserving data to range from
$12,000 per year for small companies to nearly $39 million per year for large compa-
nies.”); see also FERRIS, supra note 25, at 5 (“As blanket deletion policies have be-
come suspect . . . the new approach to retention is: Keep everything and never delete
it, except for spam and other obviously useless stuff.”); Kenneth J. Withers, Risk
Aversion, Risk Management, and the “Overpreservation” Problem in Electronic Dis-
covery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 537, 546 (2013) (explaining that “[f]ear of sanctions drives the
pressure for overpreservation”).
359. Average Cost of Hard Drive Storage, STATISTICS BRAIN, http://www.statistic
brain.com/average-cost-of-hard-drive-storage/ [http://perma.cc/NAJ9-3JY7]; see also
Sedona 2007, supra note 9, at 198 (“the costs of storage have plummeted from $20,000
per gigabyte in 1990 to less than $ 1 per gigabyte today”).
360. Average Cost of Hard Drive Storage, supra note 359.
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and $1.50 when stored offsite.361 Today, one cannot reasonably argue
that the cost of storing forty boxes of information in paper form (or
approximately one gigabyte of printed text) is cheaper than storing
the same data electronically.362 Thus, the legal system should not give
businesses a pass on data preservation based on the inordinate cost of
data storage alone. Moreover, sympathy for these businesses is argua-
bly unfounded because a significant driver for the increased duty to
retain a growing number of records comes from statutes and regula-
tions having nothing to do with the duty to preserve evidence for
litigation.363
Some argue that the high burden is not because of data storage
costs but instead due to legal costs associated with reviewing this
data—which can exceed $30,000 for one gigabyte of data.364 This is a
reasonable argument, but it ignores that businesses are likely storing
more information because of the low costs associated with electronic
storage, aggressively leveraging technology to increase productivity,365
and that associates would still be required to review relevant evidence
in preparation of litigation and in response to discovery requests re-
gardless of its form. In fact, large companies often invest millions of
dollars in “big data” technologies not because they are thinking about
discovery sanctions but to understand their customers, streamline
sales processes, optimize the supply chain, product pricing, and pack-
aging, and drive research and development.366 Thus, claims that busi-
nesses are facing outrageous data storage costs due to over
preservation solely because they fear discovery sanctions are disingen-
uous and operate to distract lawmakers, who may lack technological
and corporate insight, from the real drivers behind the rise of ESI.
Courts also seem to ignore the operational and technological ad-
vances in data retention and discovery practices. For example, predic-
tive coding, “an algorithm-based computer program that predicts the
relevancy of documents after an attorney has ‘trained’ the computer
through the manual review of a ‘seed set’ of documents,” could easily
361. Steve Mackes, Paper vs. Digital Records, GRM DOCUMENT MGMT., http://
www.grmdocumentmanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/GRM-WP_Paper-
vs.-Digital-Records.pdf [http://perma.cc/8XEJ-THJ5].
362. Sedona 2007, supra note 9, at 192 n.2.
363. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (2012) (duty to maintain audit work papers for
seven years); 29 U.S.C. § 1027 (2012) (ERISA records to be retained for six years); 26
U.S.C. § 6001 (2012) (duty to maintain tax records); 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1 (2012) (requir-
ing use records for restricted pesticides to be retained for two years); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.103 (West Supp. 2014) (duty to preserve health records for
ten years); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.602 (West 2013) (requiring money services
licensees to preserve records for at least five years).
364. Sedona 2007, supra note 9, at 192, 198 n.13.
365. See, e.g., Thomas H. Davenport & Jill Dyché, Big Data in Big Companies, SAS
INT’L INST. FOR ANALYTICS 3 (2013), http://tinyurl.com/pdd9mvg [http://perma.cc/
C5PD-FDQM] (explaining that companies can obtain a complete picture of their cus-
tomers and operations by combining unstructured and structured data).
366. Id. at 8, 11, 19.
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remedy the high costs businesses and lawyers must face.367 These and
other document review systems, such as automated classification tech-
nologies, will continue to improve, making it easier for legal depart-
ments to manage discovery requests without bearing disproportionate
costs (or, perhaps, making it even easier for businesses to destroy in-
criminating evidence).368
In time, market forces will also cause law firms and businesses to
change how they view and approach document collection, storage, and
review by adopting ever-evolving best practices.369 For example, legal
departments should employ project management and planning tech-
niques to develop a reasonable review method tailored to the circum-
stances of each case.370 Additionally, utilizing the “clawback” or
“quick peek” provisions contained in federal or state procedural rules
may protect against the inadvertent production of privileged or other-
wise confidential information and lessen the need for lawyers to comb
through each page of production.371 A “clawback” provision allows
for the return of inadvertently produced privileged materials.372
“Quick peek” provisions allow for the production of all documents
thought to be responsive without any initial privilege review so that
the requestor can take a “quick peek” to determine which documents
it actually wishes to use at trial, which are then screened for privileged
information by the producing party.373 Although each provision has
risks, these types of discovery arrangements facilitate “prompt and ec-
onomical discovery . . . by reducing the cost and burden of review by
the producing party.”374
Further, businesses might consider bringing e-discovery responsibil-
ities in-house, using internal resources to reduce costs and increase
efficiencies. At the same time, businesses and law firms have the op-
tion of outsourcing to overseas legal support providers that offer low-
cost, efficient, and reliable alternatives to document review by high-
cost associates.375 For example, in 2006, DuPont outsourced its litiga-
tion support department to an offshore provider to save an expected
367. Kristi A. Davidson, A Game of Tug of War: Balancing Broad Discovery
Against Burdensome ESI, 2014 WL 2344837, at *1 (Apr. 2014) (discussing Zubaluke,
Rule 37(e) amendments, and adverse inference instruction statistics from a 2008–2009
study).
368. FERRIS, supra note 25, at 10.
369. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Achieving
Quality in the E-Discovery Process, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 269 (2014) [hereinafter
Sedona on Quality 2014].
370. Id. at 273–76.
371. Id. at 293–94; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5); TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d).
372. Sedona on Quality 2014, supra note 369, at 293–94.
373. Id.
374. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s Notes to 2006 amendments).
375. See generally Carlo D’Angelo, Overseas Legal Outsourcing and the American
Legal Profession: Friend or “Flattener”?, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 167, 172–74
(2008).
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40% to 60% in document work and cut its annual legal costs by 3%
worldwide.376 After fifteen years of outsourcing discovery review
processes, DuPont is still satisfied with the decision.377
These strategic, technological, and process-driven innovations to
traditional document collection, preservation, and review methods
show that businesses and legal departments have alternatives to the
high costs caused by fear of discovery sanctions. Courts and rule mak-
ers should give businesses more time to adopt these modern best prac-
tices before intervening to cut back established discovery rules.
This is not to say that data retention policies are bad practice, but to
avoid culpability, parties implementing such policies should have to
show a balancing system of internal controls and compliance with
those controls to ensure that potentially relevant data is not automati-
cally destroyed when litigation has become reasonably foreseeable.
Otherwise, how is this not willful blindness? In fact, the amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will replace the current safe-
harbor provision, which states that, “a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.”378 Instead, the amended Rule will im-
pose a duty to take reasonable preservation steps when litigation is
objectively foreseeable, with “the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system” serving as one factor for the court in
determining whether a party took reasonable care to preserve missing
evidence.379 The Advisory Committee’s Notes also explain that the
prospect of litigation may call for stopping or modifying any routine
deletion operations.380 This shows that federal rule makers realize that
those anticipating litigation should not be permitted to stand idly by
and “exploit [their] routine [destruction policy] to thwart discovery
obligations” by allowing for the destruction of evidence they are re-
quired to preserve.381 Likewise, Justice Baker and Judge Scheindlin
recognized that data retention policies at odds with a duty to preserve
should not excuse the obligation.382 Of course, parties taking reasona-
ble steps to preserve information when a claim is reasonably foresee-
376. Id. at 174 (citing Pete Engardio, Let’s Offshore the Lawyers: DuPont is Farm-
ing Out Legal Services to Asia and Saving A Bundle, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 18, 2006, at
42).
377. DuPont Legal Finds a Trusted Partner in DTI Philippines Location, METRO.
CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2014, at 17, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2014/February
/17.pdf [http://perma.cc/X8N5-TRWA].
378. SEPT. 2014 APPENDIX, supra note 126, at 38 (quoting Rule 37(e) as adopted in
2006).
379. Id. at 41.
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 2006
Amendment, subdivision (f)).
382. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring);
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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able, for example, by stopping their routine destruction policy in
relation to certain data stores, should not fear a finding of intentional
spoliation. However, courts should closely scrutinize the reasonable-
ness of those preservation efforts to ensure that an alleged spoliator is
not actually hiding behind its retention policy.
Nevertheless, the upcoming amendments to the Federal Rules and
judicial decisions such as Brookshire show that rule makers and courts
are not willing to wait for market forces to prevail. Instead, spoliation
law, which expanded in the early 2000s in response to widespread cor-
porate document destruction such as the extensive document shred-
ding that occurred during Enron’s collapse,383 is contracting. This Part
has shown that the justifications for this contraction are overstated
and that other alternatives have not been thoroughly explored. Al-
though rule makers and courts primarily seek only to restrict the
harshest spoliation sanctions, these sanctions, which now require an
almost unattainable burden of proof, are most important because they
serve the necessary deterrence functions that will prevent misconduct
and push law firms, legal departments, and corporations to reevaluate
the old approaches to document management and move to efficient,
flexible models.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the destruction of evidence has always threatened the
court’s truth-seeking function, the rise of electronically stored infor-
mation poses unique problems for all parties involved. As the cost of
data storage continues to decline rapidly and the technologies availa-
ble to analyze voluminous amounts of electronic information mature,
increasing numbers of businesses and individuals are converting ex-
pensive, cumbersome paper records to highly accessible digital medi-
ums. However, storing and processing electronic information
increases the risk of unintentional evidence spoliation, making liti-
gants susceptible to potential “death-penalty” sanctions for the de-
struction of evidence.384 In the early 2000s, courts began granting
increased numbers of spoliation jury instruction requests, and spolia-
tion disputes regarding electronically stored information became com-
monplace. Businesses responded by implementing routine data
purging policies that insure against the harshest sanctions, including
the spoliation instruction. Recognizing the need to balance the inter-
ests of adjudicating legal disputes on the evidence with the financial
and resource costs associated with preserving every piece of poten-
tially relevant electronic information, most courts have endorsed rea-
383. See generally Christopher R. Egan, Arthur Andersen’s Evidence Destruction
Policy: Why Current Spoliation Standards Do Not Adequately Protect Investors, 34
TEX. TECH L. REV. 61, 62–64 (2002).
384. Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 184–85 (Tex.
2012).
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sonable routine data retention policies. But others have been
skeptical, reasoning that companies can merely hide behind such poli-
cies to protect against compelled disclosure of incriminating evidence
while avoiding severe sanctions.385 Irrespective of the split among the
courts, all courts recognize that, regardless of any routine document
destruction policy, once a party should reasonably anticipate litiga-
tion, that party should take reasonable care to ensure that relevant
evidence is preserved. However, most courts, soon to include all fed-
eral courts under the Rule 37(e) amendments, save the harshest sanc-
tions for intentional rather than merely negligent spoliation.
While the federal system is undergoing changes to its spoliation law
under the rules of civil procedure, in Brookshire, the Texas Supreme
Court delivered a comprehensive and facially reasonable framework
that resolves many questions left unanswered by past decisions—in-
cluding the circumstances under which courts may issue “death-pen-
alty” sanctions. In its opinion, the Brookshire majority recognized
that, although necessary in some cases, spoliation instructions can neg-
atively influence trial fairness by shifting the jury’s focus away from
the merits of the case to the parties’ improper conduct during discov-
ery. Because Texas spoliation has always focused on compensating in-
jured parties for missing evidence, the Court held that parties should
not present spoliation evidence to the jury and “death-penalty” spolia-
tion sanctions, specifically the spoliation jury instruction, should be
used only in extreme circumstances.386
Although many of the initial Brookshire criticisms are overstated,
there is significant merit to the dissent’s argument that the Court’s
application of the framework indicates that the Court is not likely to
find intentional spoliation when a litigant merely allows for the de-
struction of evidence pursuant to a routine destruction policy. The ma-
jority held that a party can intentionally spoliate through “willful
blindness,” where “a party does not directly destroy evidence known
to be relevant and discoverable, but nonetheless ‘allows for its de-
struction.’”387 However, it is difficult to understand why the majority
found insufficient evidence of willful blindness where the Brookshire
facts strongly suggest such culpability. Even if the Court had found
intentional spoliation, it would have reached the same conclusion by
finding that Aldridge had not shown sufficient prejudice to warrant a
spoliation instruction. But instead, the majority presumed that Al-
dridge had been prejudiced and couched its holding on the culpability
prong, blending the two elements into one insurmountable require-
ment. Further, the Brookshire majority highlighted its strong aversion
to “death-penalty” spoliation sanctions, which it exercised when ap-
385. Brookshire Bros. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 37–38 (Tex. 2014) (Guzman, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988)).
386. Id. at 14 (majority opinion).
387. Id. at 24 (quoting Hebl, supra note 178, at 97–98).
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plying the new framework to the facts. These shortcomings open the
door for litigants to destroy evidence in compliance with a document
retention policy without fearing the most severe sanctions, even
though the framework itself points the other direction.
Brookshire’s progeny shows that the lower courts have received the
Court’s message—spoliation instructions should only be given in the
most extreme circumstances, and courts granting or affirming these
instructions face a significant chance of reversal on review. The
Court’s most recent decision in Wackenhut shows that trial judges
should zealously consider all other available evidence when determin-
ing prejudice, even testimony from the spoliator’s own employees,388
and that “[t]he difference in kind and quality between the available
evidence and the spoliated evidence”389 is not all that important. It
further shows that the Court is unlikely to find intentional spoliation
when data merely erases “on its own” according to routine procedure,
even when the data owner is fully aware that litigation is imminent but
not yet filed. As a result, decisions following Brookshire demonstrate
that courts are now finding curious ways to avoid the harshest spolia-
tion sanctions. Thus, despite purporting to take a strong position
against spoliation, Brookshire effectively makes it near impossible to
prevail on a motion requesting a spoliation jury instruction.
Although cases in the early 2000s initiated an increase in the num-
ber of severe sanctions relating to the destruction of electronically
stored information, such sanctions have fallen out of favor among
courts and rule makers. Changes in Texas spoliation law and proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will make it
harder for litigants to show intentional spoliation of electronic evi-
dence and meet the other heightened requirements to support a spoli-
ation jury instruction. Thus, the era of the spoliation instruction may
be ending, so these instructions will likely become a fabled phenome-
non, rarely seen in future litigation. One hopes that courts and rule
makers will remember the cases that gave rise to the spoliation in-
struction in the first place, and realize that the purportedly high pres-
ervation costs associated with electronic evidence are largely
overstated and will likely be reduced in time through operational and
technological advances in data management and discovery practices.
388. Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917, 921 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
389. Brookshire, 438 S.W.3d at 22.
